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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The sexual exploitation and abuse of children did not start with the internet, but advances in digital
and mobile technology have enabled and facilitated related crimes. Social media platforms make
it easier for offenders to find vulnerable children. Cell phone cameras and webcams make it easier
for offenders to record the exploitation and abuse. Those same technologies enable offenders to live
stream the sexual abuse of a child from the other side of the globe. Cloud storage makes it easier for
offenders to hoard large caches of illicit images.
Now, end-to-end encryption allows offenders to trade these images with less fear of detection. “Endto-end encryption” has moved from a buzzword among tech-savvy individuals to a default setting
in many communications systems. Whereas offenders previously needed the technical know-how
to access the dark web in order to find and trade child sexual abuse material (CSAM),1 they can
now download to their cell phones any number of free end-to-end encrypted messaging apps, which
provide the same level of security and privacy as the dark web. This greatly reduces the risk to the
offender when sharing such material.
It is easy to let conversations about online child sexual exploitation and abuse devolve into no-win
arguments about the merits (or lack thereof) of end-to-end encryption. Law enforcement officials
bemoan that this technology leads to criminals “going dark,” meaning they can communicate in
places that police cannot access, even with a warrant. Privacy advocates cry that the technology
is necessary and dismiss law enforcement’s “but the children” arguments as fearmongering. This
report sidesteps this debate by simply assuming, without judgment, that end-to-end encryption is
here to stay, and asks, how are we going to combat online child sexual exploitation and abuse?
This report examines this problem in depth.
First, it discusses trends in online child sexual exploitation and abuse, it explains the impact of endto-end encryption, and it outlines the current process of detection, investigation, and prosecution.
The existing system, in which reports of these crimes flow from tech companies to a national
clearinghouse to law enforcement, is filled with multiple checks and balances, including human
reviewers. The universal adoption of end-to-end encryption across communications platforms will
make it more difficult for tech companies to detect these crimes, especially the trading of CSAM.
Second, this report details the most common patterns of harm. “Online child sexual exploitation and
abuse” is often treated as one specific category of crime: recording the sexual abuse of children and
sharing those recordings. This narrow definition fails to account for the multitude of harms that
1

Previously known as “child pornography,” “child sexual abuse material” is now the more widely accepted term to describe this category of imagery.
To clarify, CSAM is only one element of child sexual abuse and exploitation.
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fall under this umbrella term, including sexually explicit images of children in which the children
themselves appear to record the images, domestic child sex trafficking, live streams of child sexual
abuse, and the sexual exploitation of children in the context of travel and tourism. Because the
problem is broad in scope and varied in nature, the interventions necessary to combat it must be
similarly broad and bespoke.
Third, this report explores the range of ways to intervene in these patterns of harm. There are
methods focused at preventing the abuse and exploitation, including targeted education campaigns
and in-person supports and programming, as well as ways to detect the harm once it has occurred
and to minimize the negative effects. Because the internet facilitates or enables these crimes, it is
easy to focus on technical solutions. While the report presents and considers technical options,
including metadata analysis and artificial intelligence, the report also explores interventions that
fall within the ambit of civil society and/or local government, including clinical treatment and
undercover police operations.
The report ends with recommendations aimed at decision-makers who are committed to combating
online child sexual exploitation and abuse. The recommendations include:
• Improve the Report-to-Prosecution Pipeline, by setting industry standards for data
collection and retention; creating uniform criteria for lawful data requests; streamlining law
enforcement’s reporting; establishing guidelines for triaging reports; and addressing victims’
needs throughout the process. This process is central in the fight against online child sexual
exploitation and abuse, and must therefore operate efficiently.
• Engage Relevant Stakeholders, by identifying who can intervene; investing in
partnerships; leveraging incentive structures; and exploring alternative sources of signals
suggesting malicious conduct. Addressing this problem requires a whole-of-community
approach; policymakers must think broadly to assemble the right team.
• Prioritize Upstream Efforts, by investing in community-based opportunities and researching
tech-based interventions. End-to-end encryption creates a black box around communications
in which all parties want to keep private; effective responses therefore must occur earlier in the
process.
The underlying offenses are not new, but advances in mobile and digital technology have changed
the way they manifest, and technology itself is constantly evolving. To combat online child sexual
exploitation and abuse, we must also evolve.
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INTRODUCTION
Child sexual exploitation and abuse—rape of a child, child sex trafficking, child sexual abuse
material—have forever been a scourge on society. The internet did not create these crimes, but it
did make it easier to commit these offenses: easier for offenders to identify and target vulnerable
children, easier for offenders to find and create child sexual abuse material, easier for offenders to
trade these images among themselves, and easier for offenders to hoard these images.
As technology evolves, so does the problem. A major evolution in information and communication
technologies (ICTs)3—such as social media and messaging apps—is the steady trend toward the
adoption of end-to-end encryption. Whereas offenders once needed to understand how to access
the recesses of the dark web to anonymously find and trade child sexual abuse material (CSAM),4
they can now simply download to their cell phone a free messaging application with end-to-end
encryption or log on to an end-to-end encrypted live stream to view child sexual exploitation and
abuse (CSEA). These technological changes have profound implications for ways to combat the
problem. This report examines these implications and provides necessary context to identify the
best ways to intervene.
Discussions of how to combat online child sexual exploitation and abuse often morph into debate
over the wisdom of end-to-end encryption, which is a method of secure communication that prevents
third parties from accessing content while it is transferred from one system or device to another.5
End-to-end encryption is necessary to protect users’ privacy, including that of human rights activists
and journalists located in authoritarian states, and end-to-end encryption creates a black hole where
offenders can trade illicit images of abused children with impunity. Both statements are true, which
is why the debate on the propriety of end-to-end encryption is ongoing (and possibly unsettle-able).
In the context of online CSEA, the debate often treats privacy and child safety as mutually exclusive
concepts and pits them against each other.
This report avoids this debate by acknowledging that end-to-end encryption is or will become the
default across information and communication technologies. The question motivating this project is
how can stakeholders—tech companies, law enforcement, civil society—be held accountable for their
commitment to combat online CSEA given the increasing adoption and proliferation of end-to-end
encryption?
This project seeks to identify and assess the challenges in combating online CSEA, as well as the
technological tools, partnerships, and other innovative approaches that can be employed to intervene.
3
4

5

Throughout this report, “information and communication technologies” is the general term used to describe user-facing technologies—i.e., social
media platforms, messaging apps.
“Child sexual abuse material,” or CSAM, is the term typically used to replace what has otherwise been known as “child pornography,” due to the
widely accepted argument that “sexualised material that depicts or otherwise represents children is indeed a representation, and a form, of child
sexual abuse.” Interagency Working Group, Terminology Guidelines for the Protection of Children from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (herein
Luxembourg Guidelines), 2016, 38. For a more nuanced discussion of this term, see Appendix 1.
Ben Lutkevich and Madelyn Bacon, “Definition: end-to-end encryption (E2EE),” SearchSecurity, last modified June 2021, https://www.techtarget.
com/searchsecurity/definition/end-to-end-encryption-E2EE. For a more technical and nuanced explanation of end-to-end encryption, see Mallory
Knodel, Sofia Celi, Fred Baker, Olaf Kolkman, and Gurshabad Grover, “Definition of End-to-end Encryption,” IETF Datatracker, last modified
September 28, 2022, https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-knodel-e2ee-definition.
Although end-to-end encryption protects data and communications in transit, it does not prevent exploitation at the end point. For example, if
a third party accesses a user’s device, either lawfully (i.e., with a search warrant) or unlawfully (i.e., via hacking), that third party can access the
content sent and received by that device, regardless of the encryption standards applied to the communication method itself. Similarly, if either the
sender or the intended recipient elects to self-report the content voluntarily, that is another means by which a third party may access the content of
an end-to-end encrypted communication.
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The report is divided into three primary sections.
1. Understanding the Issue provides background on CSEA and the impact of the internet.
This section also provides a primer on how tech companies, law enforcement, and the public
collaborate, and it describes the central role of the National Center for Missing & Exploited
Children (NCMEC), a statutorily created, nonprofit clearinghouse for matters related to child
protection.
2. Unpacking the Harm explains the scope of the problem and identifies different ways
children are harmed through online CSEA.
3. Interventions outlines a list of interventions that can help reduce overall harm by
preventing the abuse or exploitation in the first instance, or by detecting it once it has
occurred and then either deterring escalation and further abuse, referring the offender or
victim to support services, and/or disrupting the pattern of harm.
The report closes with a series of recommendations on ways to improve the data flow among tech
companies, law enforcement, and NCMEC; how to engage relevant stakeholders; and the need to
prioritize upstream interventions.
There are also three appendixes. The first appendix defines relevant terms and explains the reason
for their use over other similar phrases. The second appendix connects particular sections of the
U.S. Criminal Code that criminalize different actions discussed herein. The list is not exhaustive but
provides some guidance as to the relevant statutory language. The third appendix describes what
the U.S. Sentencing Commission considers relevant when imposing a criminal sentence for someone
convicted of one of these offenses.
A Note on Language
Terminology around CSEA is particularly fraught, and even experts working on this issue
may disagree about the best way to describe particular elements of the offenses. There are
several reasons for this.
First, child sexual exploitation and abuse is a very difficult and emotionally laden topic.
While a dry, clinical approach to language may at times be helpful to provide some emotional
distance, there is a risk of ignoring the very real harms experienced by very real victims. It
is important to balance both these considerations so that people who work in this space can
maintain their mental health and also remember why this work is so important.
Second, this is a global problem. It is not uncommon for victims, offenders, and the electronic
service provider (ESP)6 to be based in three separate countries. As a result, multiple legal
jurisdictions are implicated, and with that, multiple sets of legal terms are used.
Third, a lot of terms that have been used historically are now understood to stigmatize,
minimize, or blame the victim. Contemporary understanding of the impact of this language
must also be taken into account.
Ultimately, this report seeks to balance all these considerations in selection and use
of language, and undoubtedly fails in many instances. The language used throughout
6

In this report, “electronic service providers” (ESPs) is the general term used for companies that provide information and communication
technologies—e.g., Facebook, WhatsApp, Google, Kik.
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this report is intended to be broadly accessible so that readers can stay engaged while
appreciating the nuances in the different issues. At first use of a term, a definition will be
provided, and Appendix 1 provides additional context and explanation for readers interested
in learning more about the choice of that term.
This report primarily focuses on U.S. law and policy, although lessons from other countries are
incorporated and suggested interventions may be applicable elsewhere. It is intended for anyone
who cares about this issue and wants to do more to combat it—decision-makers and policymakers at
tech companies, in civil society, and at law enforcement agencies, as well as officials in federal, state,
and local government.
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PART 1: UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUE
The internet did not create child sexual exploitation and abuse, but it has exacerbated it.7 The growth
of digital and mobile technology has resulted in roughly a fivefold increase in the number of people
convicted for creating child sexual abuse material (CSAM) over a 15-year period.8 Technology has
also made it easier for offenders to find vulnerable children to exploit: more than one-third of people
sentenced in 2019 for producing CSAM met their victims through an online platform, more than
double the proportion 10 years earlier.9
Before the internet, possession of CSAM was space limited; offenders could physically possess only
what they could covertly store. Now, with advances in electronic storage, that limit does not exist, and
as a result, nonproduction offenses (i.e., possession, receipt, and distribution) increasingly involve
large numbers of videos and images. Nonproduction offenses in 2019 involved a median of more
than 4,000 images, and some offenders possessed and distributed millions of images and videos.10
To be clear, these images show the abuse of the most vulnerable victims: over half of nonproduction
offenses in that same time frame included images of infants or toddlers, and nearly every offense
(99.4%) included prepubescent victims.11
Measuring the global scope of child sexual exploitation and abuse with accuracy is extraordinarily
difficult due to variations in definitions and data collection practices across jurisdictions.12 Here is
what can be stated with certainty: in 2021, NCMEC13 received over 29 million reports of suspected
child sexual exploitation, up from 21.7 million reports in 2020, and more than 10 times the number
received a decade prior.14
This dramatic increase in reports is not exclusively due to a concomitant increase in hands-on abuse
or distribution of CSAM (although increases in these activities may account for some of the change).
Instead, this increase is likely due, in part, to ESPs adopting highly efficient detection tools.15
PhotoDNA, a CSAM detection tool that relies on “perceptual hashing” technology, was developed in
7

8

9

10
11
12
13

14
15

Although CSEA occurred prior to the advent of the internet, there are certain forms of abuse and exploitation that are possible only because of
current technology, such as live-streamed abuse, discussed in greater detail below. For a discussion on cyber-enabled versus cyber-dependent
crimes, see ECPAT International, Trends in Online Child Sexual Abuse Material, April 2018, 6, https://ecpat.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/
ECPAT-International-Report-Trends-in-Online-Child-Sexual-Abuse-Material-2018.pdf.
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography: Production Offenses, October 2021, 3, https://www.ussc.gov/research/
research-reports/federal-sentencing-child-pornography-production-offenses.
The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s report notes that “child pornography production cases comprise a small percentage of the overall federal
caseload,” and so the 422% increase is calculated based on 98 offenders sentenced in fiscal year 2005 rising to 512 offenders sentenced in fiscal
year 2019.
Under U.S. law, CSAM-related offenses are often bucketed in the following way, with increasing penalties attached: (1) possession, (2) receipt
and/or distribution, and (3) production. While possession and receipt have commonly understood definitions, distribution and production are legally
broader than one might expect. For more thorough discussions of these terms, see Appendix 1.
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography: Production Offenses, 5. “[O]ver one-third (35.4%) of production offenders
sentenced in fiscal year 2019 were internet strangers who met their victims through an online platform, more than double the proportion of
offenders sentenced in fiscal year 2010 who met their victims online (14.3%).”
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography: Non-Production Offenses, June 2021, 4, https://www.ussc.gov/research/
research-reports/federal-sentencing-child-pornography-non-production-offenses.
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography: Non-Production Offenses, 4.
See, e.g., ECPAT International, Trends in Online Child Sexual Abuse Material.
According to its website, the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC) “is a private, non-profit 501(c)(3) corporation whose
mission is to … reduce child sexual exploitation, and prevent child victimization.” U.S. law mandates that electronic service providers report CSEA
detected on their platforms. This organization is described in greater detail in Appendix 1
“Our 2021 Impact,” National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.missingkids.org/content/ncmec/
en/ourwork/impact.html.
The EARN IT Act: Holding Tech Industry Accountable in the Fight Against Online Child Sexual Exploitation, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
4 (2020) (testimony of John Shehan, vice president, Exploited Children Division, NCMEC) https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Shehan%20Testimony.pdf.
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2009 and has been widely adopted throughout the tech industry.16 ESPs use this program, as well as
programs like it, to automatically scan content on their platforms to detect CSAM. This method has
proved extremely accurate, reliable, and fast.17 It is this process that Meta has used with Facebook
Messenger and that is credited for the large amount of reporting by Meta to NCMEC; in 2021,
Facebook made 22.1 million reports (out of the 29.2 million received total from ESPs) to NCMEC.18
In end-to-end encrypted environments, ESPs cannot detect and report CSAM using perceptual
hashing techniques. As more and more tech companies implement end-to-end encryption, the
volume of reports to NCMEC will likely drop dramatically. Regulations in Europe provided a realworld test case to examine the impact on reporting when hash-matching methods are disrupted. In
December 2020, the ePrivacy Directive in the European Union (EU) went into effect and, for a time,
limited ESPs’ ability to use hash-scanning technology to detect CSAM. NCMEC examined EUrelated reports submitted by ESPs in the weeks before and after the directive went into effect and
found that the number of reports deceased by 51% in the first six weeks.19
There is an oft-repeated myth that when an ESP receives notice of a “positive match” alerting to
CSAM on its platform, the account holder affiliated with that match is immediately subject to criminal
penalties.20 This is false. The process is far more complicated. Understanding the complexities of
how information flows from ESPs to NCMEC to police to prosecutors is necessary to understand
the broader issue.
Starting with NCMEC, it receives tips in one of four ways:
1. from an ESP upon detection of online CSEA,
2. from a member of the public,
3. from proactive investigative efforts by law enforcement, or
4. from an ESP that identifies the online CSEA once law enforcement serves the provider with
legal process (i.e., a subpoena or search warrant).
Currently, NCMEC recieves the overwhelming majority of tips from ESPs.21 However, as discussed
above, as end-to-end encryption continues to proliferate, tech companies’ ability to confidently
detect CSEA on their systems is expected to diminish, such that the other interventions will become
increasingly important.

16 PhotoDNA was developed in 2009 by Microsoft in partnership with Dartmouth College. “PhotoDNA,” Microsoft, accessed September 24, 2022,
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/photodna.
This program, which has since been donated to NCMEC, relies on “perceptual hashing” of images. Other companies have leveraged this same
technique to build similar detection methods, such as Apple’s NeuralHash system or Google’s CSAI Match. Perceptual hashes and other detection
methods are discussed in greater detail in part 3. For a more technical discussion of the various permutations of automated hash scanning, see Ian
Levy and Crispin Robinson, Thoughts on Child Safety on Commodity Platforms, July 21, 2022, https://arxiv.org/pdf/2207.09506.pdf.
17 Levy and Robinson, Thoughts on Child Safety on Commodity Platforms, 50–51.
18 NCMEC, 2021 CyberTipline Reports by Electronic Service Providers (ESP), 2022, https://www.missingkids.org/content/dam/missingkids/pdfs/2021reports-by-esp.pdf.
19 “European Union CyberTipline Data Snapshot: Reports Submitted by Technology Companies,” A Blog Update and EU CyberTipline Data Snapshot,
NCMEC, February 17, 2021, https://www.missingkids.org/blog/2020/we-are-in-danger-of-losing-the-global-battle-for-child-safety.
20 See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, “A Dad Took Photos of His Naked Toddler for the Doctor. Google Flagged Him as a Criminal,” New York Times, August 21,
2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/21/technology/google-surveillance-toddler-photo.html.
21 NCMEC received 29,397,681 reports in 2021. Of those, 240,598 (less than 1%) were from the public, and the remaining 29,157,083 were from
electronic service providers. NCMEC, “Our 2021 Impact.”
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FIGURE 1: THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED
CHILDREN 22

Electronic Service Provider makes a tip
to NCMEC based on the detection of
content believed to be online CSEA

NCMEC notifies host to take down
identified material

If the suspicious activity involves
reported imagery, it may undergo
human review before it is ultimately
reported to NCMEC.

Member of the Public makes a tip,
which may derive from: a child with
or without direct knowledge of the
activity; a parent, teacher, child
welfare worker, or other adult; or on
rare occasions, a community member
engaged in targeted efforts to identify
offenders online

NCMEC receives a report, which is
reviewed by an analyst

Law Enforcement
receives and
reviews the report
Law Enforcement
investigates

ESPs

Serves legal
process to ESPs

Case dismissed for
inability to prosecute

If an ESP uses an automated detection method, such as PhotoDNA, to detect the abuse, then a member
of the company’s trust and safety team reviews the content. In the United States, if the reviewer
believes that the image is CSAM or that another CSEA crime has been committed, the company
submits a report to NCMEC, pursuant to mandated reporting statutes.23
Beyond serving as a central repository for online CSEA-related tips, NCMEC serves other critical
functions in this pipeline. NCMEC analysts perform an important gatekeeping function in the space
between ESPs and law enforcement. They review each tip and make an independent assessment
of whether the report meets the criteria necessary to send to law enforcement. NCMEC is also
responsible for notifying the hosting provider when CSAM is reported on its platforms.
Once law enforcement receives a report, either from NCMEC or a member of the public, it conducts
yet another independent assessment of whether the evidence received is sufficient to open an official
investigation. If not, the case is closed. If it is sufficient, law enforcement may undertake multiple
steps to develop the case and collect evidence. Relying on the information provided in the report
from NCMEC, officers will likely apply for a search warrant for additional account information
from the original reporting company. As part of that process, a neutral magistrate judge reviews the

22 The flowcharts in this section reflect the typical law enforcement process in the United States. As one would expect, other countries have unique
laws, policies, regulations, and practices that would impact the process. However, given that many of the major ESPs are headquartered in the U.S.,
understanding this diagram can have global implications.
The red arrow indicates when a tip or case may be dismissed.
23 “In order to reduce the proliferation of online child sexual exploitation and to prevent the online sexual exploitation of children, a provider—shall,
as soon as reasonably possible after obtaining actual knowledge of any facts or circumstances” from which there is an apparent violation of any
of several enumerated child sexual exploitation and abuse statutes, “mak[e] a report of such facts or circumstances to the CyberTipline, or any
successor to the CyberTipline operated by NCMEC.” 18 U.S.C. 2258A(a)
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government’s application and approves it only if the judge determines that the application establishes
probable cause to believe the search will reveal evidence of a crime. With a signed warrant, law
enforcement can request additional account information. If the ESP that receives the request has
implemented end-to-end encryption or does not collect or retain much account information, it may
not have any additional information to provide in response to a warrant.
FIGURE 2: THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 24

Member of the Public makes a tip,
which may derive from: a child with
or without direct knowledge of the
activity; a parent, teacher, child welfare
worker, or adult; or on rare occasions,
a community member engaged in
targeted efforts to identify offenders
online

Law Enforcement receives and reviews the
report, and assesses whether the threshold
has been reached to open an investigation

Law Enforcement
investigates

Law Enforcement engages in
proactive undercover operations to
identify potential offenders

LE receives
returns
Arrest

Alternative
intervention

Refer the Child-Victim for services

Serves legal
process to ESPs

Case dismissed for
inability to prosecute

Prosecution

Victim restitution

Depending on what information the company originally provided, along with information received
from an authorized search and/or other investigative steps, law enforcement may identify the
individual who owns the account. If law enforcement has probable cause to believe that the
individual has broken the law, then it can seek an arrest warrant. This again requires review by a
neutral magistrate judge who must independently decide whether the government has established
that there is probable cause to believe the individual has broken the law. Only at this stage in the
process can law enforcement arrest the individual and prosecute the person for the alleged offenses.
At the conclusion of the investigation, rather than pursue arrest and prosecution, law enforcement
may close the case without further action or seek an alternative resolution when appropriate. No
matter which of these options it pursues, if it has identified the victim, it can refer the victim to
support services.

24 The red arrows show where the investigation may be ended for a variety of reasons, including, among other reasons, no clear evidence of a crime
(e.g., cannot confirm victim is under 18), insufficient information (e.g., unable to identify offender), or a witness who does not want to testify. The
arrows with dotted lines are those that relate to how law enforcement officials engage with the victim, if known.
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The process overall can also be visualized in the following way.
FIGURE 3: FROM REPORT TO PROSECUTION

Elecronic Service Provider makes a tip
to NCMEC based on the detection of
content believed to be online CSEA

NCMEC notifies host to take down
identified material

If the suspicious activity involved
reported imagery, it may undergo
human review before it is ultimately
reported to NCMEC.

NCMEC receives a report which is
reviewed by an analyst

Member of the Public makes a tip,
which may derive from; a child with
or without direct knowledge of the
activity; a parent, teacher, child
welfare worker, or other adult; or on
rare occasions, a community member
engaged in targeted efforts to identify
offenders online

Law Enforcement receives and
reviews the report, and assesses
whether the threshold has been
reached to open and investigation

ESPs
Serves legal
process to ESPs

Law Enforcement
investigates

Law Enforcement engages in
proactive undercover operations to
identify potential offenders

LE receives
returns

Arrest
Case dismissed for
inability to prosecute

Alternative
intervention

Refer the Child-Victim for services

Prosecution

Victim restitution

***
The sheer volume of reports that NCMEC receives in a given year overwhelms law enforcement
resources, meaning that law enforcement can investigate and prosecute only a fraction of them.
ESPs’ adoption of end-to-end encryption will result in a decrease in total reports, and while this
will ease the burden on law enforcement, it will also make it more difficult to investigate this crime.
End-to-end encryption eliminates companies from knowing the content of the communications
between users, which means the current methods of detection and reporting will not work. To get a
search warrant, law enforcement must establish it has probable cause to believe the search will yield
evidence of a crime. Without content—without the actual image of abuse or text of the conversation—
officers will have a difficult, if not impossible, time meeting this burden. To combat online CSEA
given end-to-end encryption, it is necessary to understand the various permutations of the harm in
order to identify the best methods to intervene.

Protecting Children in the Age of End-to-End Encryption | Fall 2022

8

PART 2: UNPACKING THE HARM
Online child sexual exploitation and abuse is often treated as a single problem—the sharing of
CSAM among offenders. However, online CSEA extends far beyond offenders sharing CSAM with
one another; there are many different ways the internet contributes to and/or facilitates the sexual
exploitation and abuse of children. To effectively combat this problem, it is necessary to both zoom
out—to grasp the full scope of the problem—and zoom in, to better understand the variations and
nuances within the different patterns of harm.
As explored in greater detail in part 3, different interventions are effective at combating online
CSEA in different ways at different points in different patterns of harm. This is especially true when
discussing the problem in the context of end-to-end encryption, which has the greatest impact at the
tail end of most patterns of abuse—specifically, the trading of CSAM among offenders. With the use
of end-to-end encryption treated as a given, it is necessary to move upstream in the process, which
requires comprehension of the actions that lead to the production and sharing of CSAM.
Online CSEA generally falls into one or more of four patterns (represented graphically and discussed
in greater detail below).
I. CSAM production and distribution is the recording the sexual abuse of a child and
then sharing it online. This is what is most commonly (but erroneously) understood to
encapsulate online CSEA.
II. Perceived first person material production and distribution refers to the newer trend
of explicit images that appear to be created by the child themselves, although the child may
have created the images unwittingly or unwillingly and the child may not have known about
or intended broader distribution of the imagery.
III. Internet-enabled domestic child sex trafficking describes the ways in which traffickers
and demand-side offenders use the internet in the sexual exploitation of children.
IV. Live online child sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children in the context of
travel and tourism outlines two related but distinct patterns of harm in which the child is
often located outside the United States and the sexual abuse may be live streamed for paying
customers around the world or paying customers may travel to those locations to abuse the
child.
These patterns are not mutually exclusive, nor do they represent an exhaustive description of the
problem. Instead, they are presented here in an effort to disaggregate the larger issue.
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I.

CSAM Production and Distribution

This diagram represents what is most commonly understood as online CSEA—the recording of child
sexual abuse and the distribution of that recording. Most often, when people speak about CSAM, it
is in reference to this pattern. That said, even this pattern is not a monolith and actually represents
several distinct harms that present distinct opportunities for intervention.
FIGURE 4: CSAM PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION PATTERN 25

Offender abuses Child

Offender records the abuse

Material is distributed, and
redistributed, maliciously

Offender uploads the
recorded content

Material is shared, and reshared,
nonmaliciously

This pattern begins with the hands-on sexual abuse of the child and the recording of that abuse, in
either photos or videos. Once the abuse has occurred and been recorded, the offender uploads the
content and distributes it.26 Once uploaded and initially distributed, there is the redistribution of
CSAM.27 Redistribution can be further subdivided into sharing among offender populations and
sharing for nonmalicious purposes.28

25 For this diagram and those subsequent in this section, each text box represents an action taken, and the actions in the gray text boxes are those
that could occur in end-to-end encrypted environments—for example, through the use of an encrypted chat or video application. The arrows show
directionality, indicating how actions feed into one another, and the circular arrows illustrate actions that may continue to repeat. Within any
given pattern of abuse, there may be multiple possible starting points, and the actions may interweave or repeat, resulting in revictimization and
exploitation.
26 It is possible that the offender produces CSAM and maintains it in a cache entirely disconnected from the internet, which is illegal, see 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), but outside the scope of this project as it is unimpacted by end-to-end encryption.
However, even if the offender does not send the content to others, if the offender elects to store the content on a third-party server, it will
have entered the internet ecosystem insofar as it has relied upon means or facilities of interstate commerce, establishing federal jurisdiction. 18
U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(5)(B): Any person who “knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view, any book, magazine, periodical, film,
videotape, computer disk, or any other material that contains an image of child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported using
any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or
that was produced using materials that have been mailed, or shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer; [shall be punished according to this statute]” (emphasis added).
27 The U.S. Sentencing Commission published two reports in 2021, Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography: Production Offenses (October 2021) and
Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography: Non-Production Offenses (June 2021), that are available at www.ussc.gov/topic/child-pornography.
These reports identify and discuss factors the commission recommends that judges consider when sentencing people convicted of these crimes.
To learn more about these factors, see Appendix 3.
28 Facebook conducted a sample analysis of accounts reported to NCMEC for sharing CSAM over the course of three months in 2020 and estimated
that approximately 75% of those accounts did not share the material with “malicious intent” (i.e., intent to harm a child); instead, the reported
material had been shared in “outrage” (e.g., “can you believe the horrible things that happen to children?!”) or “poor humor” (e.g., a photograph of
a child’s genitals being bitten by an animal). Facebook also acknowledges this is not a precise measurement and states that it is continuing its work
to understand intent. Antigone Davis, “Preventing Child Exploitation on Our Apps,” Meta, February 23, 2021, https://about.fb.com/news/2021/02/
preventing-child-exploitation-on-our-apps/.
This finding has not been independently verified, but it is still relevant to note because a sender’s motivation will impact what intervention is
most successful in curtailing the behavior, and strategies that target people who share in poor humor or outrage will not be effective in stopping
offenders who share for their own gratification.
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“Known” CSAM presents a different issue from a mitigation perspective than “new” CSAM.
Detecting known content, primarily through programs such as PhotoDNA, is a well-established and
effective process. “New” material—i.e., imagery that has not previously been reported and therefore
is not included in databases—cannot be detected using this method, and an equally effective method
to detect “new” content has not yet been developed. This therefore creates an important distinction
when evaluating interventions.
Whether the content is new or known, the continued harm to the victim is immense. No matter the
intent of the person who shared the content, many child victims report that the knowledge that these
images continue to circulate online causes them to feel revictimized.29 And the scale of the problem
is vast. According to NCMEC, in 2021 about 58% of image files and 89% of video files reported to
the CyberTipline by ESPs were nonunique (i.e., they had been reported multiple times).30 Facebook
found that in a sample two-month period in 2020, copies of just six videos accounted for over onehalf of all content reported.31
Once an offender has uploaded and shared the content, end-to-end encryption effectively creates
a black box around the affiliated activity, preventing ESPs from accessing the content and
preventing law enforcement from lawfully retrieving it from the provider with a search warrant.
Communications apps that use end-to-end encryption currently rely on, and continue to refine,
a set of signals and indicators intended to identify malicious users engaged in the sharing and
redistribution of CSAM (see part 3 for a more in-depth discussion of this technique). But these
indicators alone are unlikely to meet the necessary threshold for law enforcement to obtain a search
warrant for the account holder’s home or devices. Therefore, for this pattern, more than any other,
successful interventions must occur earlier in the pattern of harm due to the impact of end-to-end
encryption eliminating visibility at the tail end.

29 In a survey conducted by the Canadian Centre for Child Protection, survivors of online CSEA were asked how the creation and distribution of the
images of their abuse impacted them differently from the hands-on abuse itself. Of those who responded, 67% “pointed to the permanence of the
images and the fact that if the images are distributed, their circulation will never end,” and 70% of respondents said they “worry constantly about
being recognized by someone who has seen images of their abuse.” Canadian Centre for Child Protection, Survivors’ Survey: Executive Summary
2017, 28, https://protectchildren.ca/pdfs/C3P_SurvivorsSurveyExecutiveSummary2017_en.pdf.
30 “CyberTipline 2021 Report,” NCMEC, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.missingkids.org/gethelpnow/cybertipline/cybertiplinedata.
31 Antigone Davis, “Preventing Child Exploitation on Our Apps.”
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II.

 erceived First Person (PFP) Material Production and
P
Distribution32

This chart represents the relatively new trend of perceived first person (PFP) material—that is,
explicit imagery of a child that appears to have been taken by the child in the image. The child may
be enticed, induced, or exploited into taking the images by someone they either know in person or
met online, or they may take the images voluntarily and independently.
After taking the photo or video, or in the course of live streaming a sexual act, the child may:
1. knowingly share the imagery with someone who does not distribute it further;
FIGURE 5: K
 NOWINGLY SHARING THE IMAGERY WITHOUT FURTHER
DISTRIBUTION

Child voluntarily produces
sexually explicit material

Child privately sends material to Trusted
Person(s) without further distribution

2. knowingly share the imagery with someone who distributes it further with or without the
child’s knowledge, either to other like-minded individuals for malicious purposes, for a sense
of revenge and/or control, or for other motivations;
FIGURE 6: KNOWINGLY SHARING THE IMAGERY WITH FURTHER DISTRIBUTION

Child voluntarily produces
sexually explicit material

Child sends material to Trusted Person(s) who further disseminates
the content with or without the Child’s knowledge and/or permission

Child voluntarily distributes or releases material in encrypted or
unencrypted environment

Child involuntarily produces
sexually explicit material

Child sends material
to Offender

Material is distributed
and redistributed

32 “Perceived first person CSAM” is the term advocated by the Tech Coalition, as opposed to the widely adopted “self-generated CSAM.” It argues
that the term “self-generated” implies agency by the child and therefore may infer blame while also failing to capture coercion and enticement,
which are common in this pattern. See Tech Coalition, Self-Generated Indecent Imagery Featuring Youth: Challenges & Opportunities, April 2021, 3,
https://www.technologycoalition.org/knowledge-hub/this-is-test-knowledge-2.
Furthermore, while many of the images created are taken by the child, offenders may also remotely access the child’s webcam and record images
without the child’s authorization or knowledge. For a more detailed discussion of this term, see Appendix 1.
For the figures in this section, italicized text refers to actions that do not contribute to online CSEA but that are necessary to understand the full
range of related behaviors.
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3. unwittingly share the images with an individual who has gained unauthorized access to the
child’s files; and/or
FIGURE 7: UNWITTINGLY SHARED IMAGES THROUGH UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS

Child voluntarily produces
sexually explicit material
Explicit material is accessed
by Third Party

Material is distributed
and redistributed

Child involuntarily produces
sexually explicit material

4. distribute the image voluntarily via online platforms.
FIGURE 8: VOLUNTARY DISTRIBUTION

Child voluntarily produces
sexually explicit material

Child voluntarily distributes or releases material
in encrypted or unencrypted environment

In some instances, the possession of one explicit image may result in the recipient exploiting or
blackmailing the child for additional, often increasingly explicit, imagery (i.e., sextortion).
When the child is enticed, coerced, or blackmailed into producing this content, in-person sexual
abuse may also be involved, either between the child and offender or between the child and another
child they may be exploited into abusing. In either case, images and videos may be taken of the handson abuse, which could feed back into the CSAM production and distribution pattern described above.
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Collectively, this pattern can be represented as follows.
FIGURE 9: P
 ERCEIVED FIRST PERSON (PFP) MATERIAL PRODUCTION AND
DISTRIBUTION

Child privately sends material
to Trusted Person(s) without
further distribution

Child voluntarily produces
sexually explicit material

Child sends material to
Trusted Person(s) who further
disseminates the content
with or without the Child’s
knowledge and/or permission

In-person
meeting

Online
communication
Online
meeting

Explicit material is accessed
by Third Party

Child involuntarily produces
sexually explicit material

Child voluntarily distributes or
releases material in encrypted or
unencrypted environment

Offender exploits Child to
produce more material

Child sends material to Offender

Material is distributed and
redistributed

Although this is a relatively new phenomenon, it represents a large portion of the CSAM in the
internet ecosystem. The Internet Watch Foundation reported that in 2020, 44% of confirmed
CSAM contained perceived first person images, and in 2021, seven out of ten reports received by
the Internet Watch Foundation included this type of content, representing dramatic increases from
previous years.33

33 Six in ten of the Internet Watch Foundation’s “actioned reports specifically show the sexual abuse of an 11-13 year old girl who has been groomed,
coerced or encouraged into sexual activities via a webcam.” See Internet Watch Foundation, The Annual Report 2021, “2021 Trends & Data,”
accessed September 24, 2022, https://annualreport2021.iwf.org.uk/trends.
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Irrespective of the morality or wisdom of the practice, sharing explicit photographs with romantic
partners and even friends is increasingly part of adolescents’ interpersonal and sexual development.34
Research from 2020 found that about 20% of children ages 9 to 12 agreed that “it’s normal for people
my age to share nudes with each other,” and 34% of 13-to-17-year-olds agreed with that statement.35
The same study found that among children who have shared nudes, half reported that they had shared
a nude photograph or video with someone they had not met in real life, and 41% reported that they
had shared a nude photo or video with someone age 18 or older.36 Beyond seeing a higher percentage
of PFP content, researchers have identified the troubling trend of PFP content being “harvested”
from their original upload location and posted to other publicly accessible sites.37
Every action within this pattern of abuse can occur within an end-to-end encrypted environment,
including the initial contact between the child and offender, as popular social media platforms adopt
end-to-end encrypted messaging.38
Unlike the typical production and distribution pattern described above, where communication is
among offenders, the communications here typically involve the child victim. This is an important
distinction when evaluating interventions to online CSEA. When adults share and receive CSAM for
their own gratification, they are likely aware they are engaging in illegal behavior and would therefore
not choose to report the content of their communications to a third party (either the company or
law enforcement). However, a child victim may elect to self-report, and because the content is
unencrypted on the child’s device, so long as the child provides authorization, the content can be
accessed by a third party even if it was sent and received in an end-to-end encrypted environment.

34 Law enforcement officials should not prioritize criminal investigation of these children. Instead, they should focus on individuals who exploit,
coerce, and/or blackmail children and those who access and/or distribute the explicit images without authorization.
35 Thorn, Self-Generated Child Sexual Abuse Material: Youth Attitudes and Experiences in 2020: Findings from 2020 quantitative research among 9–17
year olds, November 2021, https://www.thorn.org/resources-and-research/.
36 This report relied on findings from a 20-minute online survey that collected self-reported data from minors 9 to 17. The sample included 742 9-to-12year-olds and 1,260 13-to-17-year-olds. However, within that sample, respondents were split into two groups—one responding to questions about
perceived hurdles to disclosure and one on the experience of and attitudes about perceived first person CSAM (relevant here). For this latter group,
351 9-to-12-year-olds and 651 13-to-17-year-olds participated. Data was weighted to age, gender, race, and geography to yield a representative
nationwide sample. Thorn, Self-Generated Child Sexual Abuse Material: Youth Attitudes and Experiences in 2020.
37 In 2015, researchers from the Internet Watch Foundation, with support from Microsoft, analyzed 3,803 photos and videos that were taken and
supposedly shared by young people. Of these images, 89.9% had been “harvested” and posted to other public sites, and 100% of the images
analyzed depicting children 15 and younger had been harvested and posted elsewhere. Internet Watch Foundation, Emerging Patterns and Trends
Report #1: Online-Produced Sexual Content, March 10, 2015, 11, https://www.iwf.org.uk/media/2saninlk/online-produced_sexual_content_
report_100315.pdf.
38 One law enforcement official reported that approximately 50% of content traded in end-to-end encrypted environments is “first generation”—i.e.,
new, perceived first person content. Interview by author, September 15, 2021.
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III. Internet-Enabled Domestic Child Sex Trafficking39
Unlike the patterns described above, much of this pattern of abuse occurs outside the confines of
the internet. However, research suggests that technology plays an increasingly important role in
grooming40 and controlling child victims of sex trafficking, even while most victims have in-person
contact with their traffickers.41
FIGURE 10: INTERNET-ENABLED DOMESTIC CHILD SEX TRAFFICKING PATTERN

In-person connection between
Trafficker & Child-Victim

Trafficker connects DemandSide Offender to Child-Victim
Communication among/between
Trafficker, Demand-Side Offender,
and/or Child-Victim

Trafficker communicates
with Child-Victim, in-person
and/or online, building
rapport and trust

Trafficker exerts effective
control and/or influence
over the Child-Victim
Demand-Side Offender
makes payment

Trafficker directs/posts online “ad”
Online connection between
Trafficker & Child-Victim

Demand-Side Offender
sexually abuses Child-Victim

After establishing trust with the child, the trafficker is able to control the child victim and arranges
for demand-side offenders to sexually exploit the child.42 Unlike in the previously described patterns,
there is a commercial element to child sex trafficking. The demand-side offender sexually exploits
the child and, in exchange, provides money or other things of value (such as shelter or food). Inperson abuse, by either the trafficker or demand-side offender, can occur throughout this cycle and
be recorded, and PFP images can be created as part of online “advertisements.” Regardless of how

39 “Child sex trafficking” is defined in U.S. law as knowingly “recruit[ing], entic[ing], harbor[ing], transport[ing], provid[ing], obtain[ing], advertis[ing],
maintain[ing], patroniz[ing], or solicit[ing] by any means” a person who “has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a
commercial sex act.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591. It is typically treated as synonymous with “sexual exploitation of children in/for prostitution” or “child
prostitution,” but as with “child pornography,” “prostitution” connotes consent, which is necessarily absent when a child is involved. For a longer
discussion of this term, see Appendix 1.
40 “Grooming” is defined in the Luxembourg Guidelines as “the short name for the solicitation of children for sexual purposes. ‘Grooming/online
grooming’ refers to the process of establishing/building a relationship with a child either in person or through the use of the Internet or other digital
technologies to facilitate either online or offline sexual contact with that person” (italics in the original). Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg
Guidelines, 51. For a longer discussion of the term, see Appendix 1.
41 Thorn and Vanessa Bouché, Survivor Insights: The Role of Technology in Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking, January 2018, https://www.thorn.org/
survivor-insights/.
42 “Demand-side offender” is the term recommended by interviewees to describe the offender who engages in child sexual abuse and/or exploitation
for the offender’s own sexual gratification. In contrast, the term “trafficker” describes an individual who aids, facilitates, and/or coordinates the
hands-on abuse or CSAM production, often with commercial motivation. That is not to say that the trafficker may not also sexually abuse the child,
but that their role is typically distinct. Interview by author, February 10, 2022; interview by author, April 14, 2022.
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or when the explicit material is produced in this cycle, this content could feed back into the CSAM
production and distribution pattern described above.
A survey of survivors of sex trafficking found that the median age of victims when first trafficked was
14 years old. For children younger than 10, the trafficker was almost exclusively a family member.
Survey respondents who were older than 11 when first trafficked were “most likely to be trafficked
by strangers, followed by people in their social network.”43 Many survivors “experienced some form
of childhood abuse and neglect, reporting high rates of verbal, physical, or sexual abuse.”44 This
volatility may have contributed to the children’s susceptibility to traffickers’ offers of food and shelter
and promises of love and wealth.
End-to-end encryption obscures the content of communication among all parties—the child, the
trafficker, and the demand-side offender. When the child is party to the communication, that may
provide an opportunity to obtain the content. However, a strong majority (88%) of respondents to the
aforementioned survivor survey reported they would not want their trafficker prosecuted,45 which
means they may not be willing to cooperate with law enforcement. In-person interventions may
therefore provide some of the more promising solutions to combat this pattern of harm.

IV. Live Online Child Sexual Abuse46 &
Sexual Exploitation of Children in the Context of Travel and
Tourism47
The in-person components of this offense pattern most commonly occur outside the United States,
but demand-side offenders—both those who pay for and view the live-streamed abuse and those who
travel to sexually exploit children—come from all over the world, including the United States.48 In
countries such as the Philippines, nearly every referral about CSEA from foreign law enforcement
agencies involves production of new imagery, often with a commercial component. These cases
typically take the form of either live online child sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of children in
the context of travel and tourism.
For live online child sexual abuse, demand-side offenders initiate contact with possible traffickers
using the surface web (not the dark web),49 looking for people who fit the common profile of a
trafficker—for example, someone from a particular geographic region who posts suggestive photos of
children and uses flirtatious language. If the prospective trafficker responds in kind, they engage in
43
44
45
46

Thorn and Vanessa Bouché, Survivor Insights: The Role of Technology in Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking.
Thorn and Vanessa Bouché, Survivor Insights: The Role of Technology in Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking.
Thorn and Vanessa Bouché, Survivor Insights: The Role of Technology in Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking.
Live online child sexual abuse “often represents a dual abuse of the child. She/he is coerced to participate in sexual activities, alone or with other
persons—an act that already constitutes sexual abuse. The sexual activity is, at the same time, transmitted live through ICT and watched by others
remotely.” Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg Guidelines, 46. For a more detailed explanation of this term, see Appendix 1.
47 Sexual exploitation of children in the context of travel and tourism “refers to sexual exploitation of children that is embedded in a context of travel,
tourism, or both. The offence can be committed by either foreign or domestic tourists and travellers and longer-term visitors. … The term … is
used as an alternative to the broadly used term ‘child sex tourism.’” Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg Guidelines, 55. For a more complete
definition, see Appendix 1.
48 International Justice Mission, Online Sexual Exploitation of Children in the Philippines: Analysis and Recommendations for Governments, Industry,
and Civil Society (Summary Report), 2020, https://www.ijm.org/studies.
49 The “clear web,” or “surface web,” consists of all publicly accessible websites that are indexed by search engines (e.g., https://www.wcl.
american.edu). The “deep web” consists of the parts of the internet not indexed by traditional search engines (e.g., the landing page seen
when logged in to one’s bank account). The “dark web” refers to a part of the internet not indexed by traditional search engines and that is only
accessible through specific technical tools. (See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI and Partners Target Online Drug Markets,” accessed
September 24, 2022, https://www.fbi.gov/video-repository/jcode-102621.mp4/view.) The “open web” refers to the publicly accessible areas of the
clear and dark webs—i.e., those that do not require a password to access.
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back-and-forth trust-building dialogue, often moving to encrypted messaging apps, resulting in the
negotiation of an exchange of money for different levels of abuse/exploitation (e.g., still image, video,
etc.).
FIGURE 11: LIVE ONLINE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE

Sexual abuse of Child-Victim is
live streamed

In-person connection between
Trafficker & Child-Victim and/or
family members

Trafficker communicates with
Child-Victim and/or family members,
building rapport and trust

Trafficker exerts effective control and/
or influence over the Child-Victim

Demand-Side Offender
makes payment

Trafficker agrees to
produce a live stream of
abuse for Demand-Side
Offender

Demand-Side Offender and Trafficker
communicate, establish trust, and negotiate

Demand-Side Offender
contacts Trafficker

In the case of sexual exploitation of children in the context of travel and tourism, demand-side
offenders and possible traffickers communicate using the same pattern as in the case of live online
abuse—identify likely traffickers, initiate contact, and engage in trust-building. The difference is
that the intended outcome of the demand-side offender in this scenario is to travel to exploit the child
in person.
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FIGURE 12: SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN IN THE CONTEXT
OF TRAVEL AND TOURISM

In-person connection between
Trafficker & Child-Victim and/or
family members

Trafficker communicates with
Child-Victim and/or family members,
building rapport and trust

Demand-Side Offender sexually abuses Child-Victim

Demand-Side Offender makes payment

Trafficker exerts effective control and/
or influence over the Child-Victim

Demand-Side Offender travels

Demand-Side Offender and Trafficker
communicate, establish trust, and
negotiate

Trafficker agrees to facilitate in-person
abuse by Demand-Side Offender

Demand-Side Offender contacts Trafficker

For both categories, there is typically a familial relationship between the trafficker and the child,
and the trafficker builds and ultimately wields influence over the child.50

50 In research conducted by the International Justice Mission (IJM) about online sexual exploitation of children (OSEC) in the Philippines, 41% of
victims were trafficked by their biological parents, and 42% were trafficked by other relatives. The IJM report defines OSEC as “the production, for
the purpose of online publication or transmission, of visual depictions (e.g. photos, videos, live streaming) of the sexual abuse or exploitation of a
minor for a third party who is not in the physical presence of the victim, in exchange for compensation.” The report is focused on OSEC originating
from the Philippines in part because of IJM’s work with the government of the Philippines and in part because of the prevalence of OSEC in the
Philippines. “Live-streaming OSEC is not unique to the Philippines, but it is believed to be more prevalent in the Philippines than in other countries
due to numerous enabling factors such as widespread, inexpensive access to internet, a robust money transfer infrastructure, widespread English
language proficiency, and the country’s historic commercial sex industry impacting its reputation as a sex trafficking source country.” International
Justice Mission, Online Sexual Exploitation of Children in the Philippines: Analysis and Recommendations for Governments, Industry, and Civil
Society (Summary Report).
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FIGURE 13: H
 OW LIVE ONLINE ABUSE OVERLAPS WITH EXPLOITATION IN THE
CONTEXT OF TRAVEL AND TOURISM
In-person connection between
Trafficker & Child-Victim and/or
family members

Trafficker communicates with
Child-Victim and/or family members,
building rapport and trust

Demand-Side Offender sexually abuses Child-Victim

Demand-Side Offender makes payment

Demand-Side Offender travels

Trafficker exerts effective control and/
or influence over the Child-Victim

Trafficker agrees to facilitate in-person
abuse by Demand-Side Offender

Demand-Side Offender and Trafficker
communicate, establish trust, and
negotiate

Sexual abuse of Child-Victim
is live streamed

Demand-Side Offender
makes payment
Demand-Side Offender contacts Trafficker
Trafficker agrees to produce a live stream of
abuse for Demand-Side Offender

This entire pattern is not a closed loop—every trafficker engages with multiple demand-side
offenders, and demand-side offenders are typically in contact with multiple traffickers. Payment
for live-streamed content is typically handled through a money transfer agency that can conduct
international transfers, whereas payment for in-person abuse by traveling demand-side offenders
is more often provided in cash. The scope of this problem is difficult to calculate, although one
organization estimates that worldwide, about one million children are in “forced sexual exploitation”
on any given day.51
As with the first pattern of harm, most steps in this pattern occur in end-to-end encrypted
environments. Because the individuals in communication (i.e., the trafficker and demand-side
offender) are engaged in illegal actions, they are adversarial to law enforcement and will not
voluntarily self-report the content to a third party. Successful interventions in this pattern will
therefore need to focus on any unencrypted surfaces and upstream nodes.

51

International Labour Office, Walk Free Foundation, and International Organization for Migration, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced
Labour and Forced Marriage, 2017, referenced at https://www.ecpatusa.org/statistics.
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PART 3: INTERVENTIONS
Online child sexual exploitation and abuse is a complex problem, and combating it requires a wide
complement of efforts. There is no silver bullet. The ideas discussed in this section are presented as
“interventions” rather than “solutions” because though they can aid in mitigating and reducing the
harm, none of them solves the problem.
Because the unifying thread in online CSEA is the internet, the temptation is to look exclusively at
technological solutions. However, the underlying issue—child sexual exploitation and abuse—would
exist even if the internet did not. While there are some promising technological interventions, they
must be considered within the larger context of the issue and should be explored concurrently with
in-person, nontechnical solutions for a holistic approach to address the problem.
Table 1 (below) lists the interventions identified throughout the course of this project. (They
are described in greater detail later in this section.) They are organized by the purpose of the
intervention—prevent, detect, deter, refer, and disrupt—to provide an overarching structure, but
these categories are neither perfect nor exhaustive. They also cannot be considered in isolation; for
example, any intervention intended to “detect” online child abuse or exploitation must be paired
with one or more interventions that seeks to deter, refer, and/or disrupt.
TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF POSSIBLE INTERVENTIONS
Purpose

Prevent

Detect

Deter
Refer
Disrupt

Intervention Method
Community spaces for marginalized youth
Comprehensive sex education
Online safety education for children (embedded in the ICT)
Perpetration prevention programs
Safety by design
Tech security education for children (in person)
Artificial intelligence image content analysis
Perceptual hashing
Metadata analysis
Text-based analysis
Undercover operations
User reports
Issue warning notices to user
Redirect likely offenders
Redirect likely victims
Investigate and arrest
Deplatform abusive account
Prevent creation and/or dissemination of CSAM

These interventions reflect the current environment and technical capabilities (and ambitions).
Offender behavior morphs. Apps and platforms ebb and flow in popularity and use. Policies and
Protecting Children in the Age of End-to-End Encryption | Fall 2022

21

practices must be sensitive to these shifts, and decision-makers must be willing to make changes
and updates as needed.
Each arrow in the patterns described in part 2 represents a potential intervention point. At each
point, there could be multiple strategies, techniques, and/or solutions, technical or nontechnical,
that could be implemented by a variety of stakeholders (i.e., social networking platforms, messaging
apps, device manufacturers, safety tech firms, law enforcement, legislators). The immediate goal of
the intervention may be prevention, detection, deterrence, referral, disruption, or some combination
thereof, so long as the overarching purpose is to combat online CSEA.
Balancing costs and benefits
Every intervention has pros and cons, and decision-makers should carefully evaluate them
in light of their intended and incidental impacts. Every intervention also imposes a cost,
and there are limitations and barriers to implementation and/or scalability, including
resources (money and/or time), technology (the technical capability is not ready for
implementation or is not scalable), regulation/legislation (laws and/or regulations that
prohibit or stymie a particular action), design (the capability exists, but its current design
limits its broad use), social (there is a social stigma attached to a particular endeavor), and
privacy (implementation may undercut some protections otherwise afforded through endto-end encryption). Policymakers must consider whether the cost of an intervention is
worth it, while keeping in mind that the cost of doing nothing is to allow online CSEA to
continue unabated.
The European Commission outlined a set of five assessment criteria that present a useful
framework for evaluating any intervention.52
1. Effectiveness: how well does the solution detect and report known and unknown
[CSAM]?
2. Feasibility: how ready is the solution and how easily can it be implemented, in terms of
cost, time and scalability?
3. Privacy: how well does the solution ensure the privacy of the communications?
4. Security: how vulnerable is the solution to be misused for other purposes than the fight
against [online CSEA], including by companies, governments or individuals?
5. Transparency: to what extent can the use of the solution be documented and be
publicly reported to facilitate accountability through ongoing evaluation and oversight
by policymakers and the public?
A recurring theme in discussions of this issue is that proposed interventions will intrude
on users’ privacy. A complete discussion of the privacy aspects of the online CSEA problem
is beyond the scope of this report, but two relevant points are worth considering when
evaluating interventions. First, although a general user’s privacy should be part of the
analysis, the countervailing privacy interest of the child depicted in the CSAM must also be
52

European Commission, Technical solutions to detect child sexual abuse in end-to-end encrypted communications, https://www.politico.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/SKM_C45820090717470-1_new.pdf. This document is a draft report that was leaked in September 2020.
Many civil society organizations took issue with the leaked draft’s approach to encryption. See, e.g., Global Encryption Coalition, Breaking
encryption myths: What the European Commission’s leaked report got wrong about online security, https://www.globalencryption.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/11/2020-Breaking-Encryption-Myths.pdf. However, despite its limitations, the draft provides a helpful framework to consider when
evaluating any proposed intervention.
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taken into account. It is a grave invasion of their privacy when offenders post these images
on the internet and redistribute them. Second, privacy itself requires a more nuanced
examination—specifically, privacy vis-à-vis whom? The strictest interpretation as applied
to communications would be privacy from all parties except the sender and intended
recipient. But on a more nuanced level, people may be focused on privacy from unreasonable
access by the government, from malicious actors such as criminal hackers, or from private
companies. When balancing users’ privacy with combating online CSEA, policymakers
must be transparent in how they define privacy.
***

I.

Prevent

Given how end-to-end encryption shields particular activities from detection, the most effective
ways to intervene involve moving further upstream in the patterns of harm—preventing the abuse,
preventing the exploitation, preventing the dissemination of existing content. The interventions
listed here often involve community-based and in-person strategies, but there are also opportunities
for tech companies to engage.
A. COMMUNITY SPACES FOR MARGINALIZED YOUTH

Young people naturally seek connection. To prevent that void from being filled by a predator,
communities should seek to provide safe alternatives—whether through enhanced contact with
community elders or with peers. This is especially necessary for marginalized youth populations,
such as transgender and queer children, who are at a heightened risk of exploitation.53 This
intervention would likely be most effective at curbing internet-enabled domestic child sex trafficking.
While many trusted organizations provide safe community spaces for children, it is worth noting
that children are more likely to be abused by a trusted person rather than a stranger.54 Policymakers
seeking to implement this intervention in their community may want to impose structures to
mitigate this risk, such as minimizing one-on-one time between children and adults and providing
transparent screening and supervision guidelines for staff and volunteers.55
B. COMPREHENSIVE SEX EDUCATION

Comprehensive sex education provides youth with the information necessary to make healthy
decisions and responsible choices about their sexual and social relationships, and research suggests
that it can help prevent sexual assault.56 Children armed with knowledge about healthy relationships
may be more likely to self-report when an offender approaches them (as discussed below) because the
child has learned to recognize what qualifies as harmful contact. This intervention would be most
effective at preventing the production and dissemination of PFP CSAM but may also be relevant in

53 Interview by author, February 1, 2022.
54 “Resources: Understand and Identify Child Sexual Abuse,” Canadian Centre for Child Protection, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.
protectchildren.ca/en/resources-research/understanding-child-sexual-abuse/.
55 For more information, see Child Welfare Information Gateway at https://www.childwelfare.gov/.
56 SIECUS: Sex Ed for Social Change, If you care about sexual assault prevention… Then you should care about SEX ED, 2020, https://siecus.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/If-Then-Sexual-Assault-Final.pdf.
See also Savannah Sly and Tarah Wheeler, “An education-based approach to curbing CSAM production,” Brookings Institution, March 17,
2022, https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/an-education-based-approach-to-curbing-csam-production/. (“Predators lurking on chat sites
would have a harder time grooming and exploiting youth if young people were equipped with knowledge about boundaries, consent, and healthy/
unhealthy relationships.”)
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other situations where an offender seeks to gain the trust and ultimate control of the child, such as
child sex trafficking.
One challenge with this approach is that people may believe it shifts the burden, transferring the
responsibility from the adult offender to the child victim. Its values, however, exceed the narrow
purpose of preventing online CSEA, and therefore, policymakers should envision it as just one part
of a larger suite of intervention efforts.
C. ONLINE SAFETY EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN (EMBEDDED IN THE ICT)

ICTs, including social media platforms and messaging apps, can integrate program-specific
education for children, such as how to report abuse, set personal limits, understand the risk of taking/
sending explicit photos, and find support if needed. For example, the Roblox education team takes
the approach that when it has a child’s attention, it wants to instill technical skills alongside civility,
digital literacy, and online safety.57 Another opportunity for platforms is the implementation of inapp reminders with safety tips. For example, Facebook prompts children to accept “friend requests”
only from people they know.58
As with comprehensive sex education, decision-makers must be careful not to blur the line between
supporting children with necessary knowledge and burdening children with excess responsibility.
Safety education may be necessary, but it is not sufficient to combat the problem.
D. PERPETRATION PREVENTION PROGRAMS

There are a few examples of promising practices in this area. First, experts believe that providing
peer support for people who are at risk of offending, but who have committed never to harm a child,
can reduce child sexual abuse. An example of this model is the MAP (Minor-Attracted People)
Support Club, which seeks to serve this goal while incorporating high standards of accountability
for its members.59 Similarly, there are hotlines available where people worried about sexual thoughts
or behaviors involving children can receive confidential support.60
Perpetration-prevention therapy has also been shown to help intervene with people at risk of sexually
abusing children. In particular, Michael Seto, the director of forensic rehabilitation research in the
Integrated Forensic Program of the Royal Ottawa Health Care Group, and Elizabeth Letourneau,
director of the Moore Center for the Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse at Johns Hopkins University,
along with their colleagues, have conducted extensive research in this area with promising results.61

57 Interview by author, November 9, 2021. Although Roblox does not provide end-to-end encrypted communications, its education approach is
relevant here, given that its target audience is children.
58 “Safety Resources for Parents: What steps does Facebook take to keep minors safe?” Help Center, Facebook, accessed September 24, 2022,
https://www.facebook.com/help/1079477105456277.
59 “MAP Support Club,” Prostasia Foundation, accessed September 24, 2022, https://prostasia.org/project/map-support-club/.
60 “Resources for People Concerned About Their Own Sexual Thoughts and Behavior,” Moore Center for the Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse, Johns
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/moorecenter-for-the-prevention-of-child-sexual-abuse/resources/csa-prevention/.
61 “Preventing Child Sexual Abuse Before It Begins,” Moore Center for the Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of
Public Health, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/moore-center-for-the-prevention-of-childsexual-abuse/; “Forensic Mental Health,” The Royal’s Institute of Mental Health Research, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.theroyal.
ca/research/forensic-mental-health.
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Focusing on perpetrators and potential perpetrators may seem like a misuse of limited resources to
combat this issue when so much support is needed to help victims of these crimes. However, effective
demand-side interventions may have the broadest impact because by lowering the demand, there
should be a concurrent reduction in the number of children exploited and abused as well.
E. SAFETY BY DESIGN

Safety by design “focuses on the ways technology companies can minimise online threats by
anticipating, detecting and eliminating online harms before they occur.”62 Australia’s eSafety
Commissioner has worked closely with industry, civil society, and product users (including children)
to develop standards under this rubric.63 The basic premise is that tech companies should implement
safety controls and user protections from the outset of product development. As one interviewee said:
“Safety by design is a good way to think. Security and privacy by design are important, but safety is
critical.”64
One challenge to widespread implementation of this ideal is cost—new start-ups face an uphill
challenge to compete against well-established firms and may not have the necessary infrastructure
to support effective content moderation and other key elements. The eSafety Commissioner’s office is
working to level the playing field by engaging directly with the investment community to encourage
the incorporation of safety by design into investment criteria and by providing practical tools and
resources to the start-up community.
Examples of Safety by Design in Practice
Yubo instilled user safety as a company priority at inception and has continued to
emphasize it as the company has grown.65 The company recently launched a new ageverification procedure with the express purpose of keeping users safe.66
•

WhatsApp, one of the most widely used end-to-end encrypted messaging services,
prohibits users from searching for people they do not already know and requires a user
to have another user’s phone number in order to contact them.67

•

For websites and platforms that primarily host explicit adult content, a
disconnect often exists between the incentives for people managing the site and the

62 “Safety by Design,” eSafety Commissioner, Australian government, accessed September 24, 2022 https://www.esafety.gov.au/industry/safety-bydesign.
63 John Perrino, “Using ‘safety by design’ to address online harms,” Brookings Institution, July 26, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/
using-safety-by-design-to-address-online-harms/.
Australia’s eSafety Commissioner has promoted three core principles to safety by design: “1. Service provider responsibility. The burden of
safety should never fall solely upon the user. Every attempt must be made to ensure that online harms are understood, assessed and addressed in
the design and provision of online platforms and services. … 2. User empowerment and autonomy. The dignity of users is of central importance.
Products and services should align with the best interests of users. … 3. Transparency and accountability. Transparency and accountability are
hallmarks of a robust approach to safety. They not only provide assurances that platforms and services are operating according to their published
safety objectives, but also assist in educating and empowering users about steps they can take to address safety concerns” (bold in original).
“Safety by Design: Principles and background,” eSafety Commissioner, Australian government, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.
esafety.gov.au/industry/safety-by-design/principles-and-background.
64 Interview by author, September 23, 2021.
65 For a panel interview featuring Yubo’s Marc-Antoine Durand discussing the company’s safety commitment, see “Day 3: Global Tech
Innovations // Global Resolve Against Online Sexual Exploitation of Children 2020,” International Justice Mission, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=x9zcEK36mys.
66 “Yubo’s new age verification feature helps keep you safe,” Yubo, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.yubo.live/blog/yubos-new-ageverification-feature-helps-keep-you-safe.
67 “How WhatsApp Helps Fight Child Exploitation,” Help Center, WhatsApp, accessed September 24, 2022, https://faq.whatsapp.
com/154956905959033/?locale=en_US.
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incentives for people creating content for the site. Content creators are often aligned
with people seeking to combat child exploitation; by empowering creators to have more
control over platform design features, less illicit content would be hosted on a given site.
For instance, mandating preverified uploads—i.e., content cannot be uploaded without
express consent and age verification of the individuals featured—protects both groups:
content creators ensure their original work cannot be copied and uploaded without their
permission, and CSAM would also be prevented from upload.68
Other design decisions referenced by interviewees include age verification and age-gated
content; contact limits, wherein a communications app prevents “cold contact” with
an individual not already saved to the device’s contacts; and alignment of the incentive
structures of the company, content creators, and users.
F. TECH SECURITY EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN (IN PERSON)

In addition to opportunities provided for tech companies to intervene within a given application
or platform, children would benefit from tech safety literacy more broadly, and any trusted adult,
including educators, parents, and caregivers, can bear this responsibility.69
As with any prevention method targeted to children, decision-makers should be mindful in how
they message these education opportunities, as it risks development of a victim-blaming mentality
when something goes wrong and shifting the burden of prevention from the potential offender to the
potential victim. That said, given the prominence of technology in everyday life, it would be negligent
not to ensure children have the skills necessary to safely navigate the online world.

II.

Detect

Even if policymakers implement a full suite of prevention methods, there will remain a need to
detect CSEA online. There are six primary ways to detect this content—artificial intelligence image
content analysis, hash scanning, metadata analysis, text-based analysis, undercover operations, and
user reports.70 Each of these methods has benefits and risks, discussed in greater detail below.
It is also necessary to understand where in the internet ecosystem to apply these methods. Some
online CSEA activities occur outside end-to-end encrypted environments, such as an offender
making initial contact with a potential victim or harvesting PFP content and posting it to public
websites. In these non-end-to-end encrypted environments, more detection options are available.
Detection of online CSEA within end-to-end encrypted spaces is more complicated. The
aforementioned European Commission draft report on technical solutions identified three basic
components to end-to-end encrypted communication: device, server, and encryption type. These
68 Interview by author, January 12, 2022.
69 For examples of available resources, see “Guides to Online Safety,” ECPAT-USA, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.ecpatusa.org/
onlinesafetytips; “Resources: Online Safety,” Canadian Centre for Child Protection, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.protectchildren.
ca/en/resources-research/online-safety/; “Guides and resources: Children and young people,” UK Safer Internet Centre, accessed September
24, 2022, https://saferinternet.org.uk/guide-and-resource/young-people; “NetSmartz,” NCMEC, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.
missingkids.org/NetSmartz.
70 In Outside Looking In: Approaches to Content Moderation in End-to-End Encrypted Systems, published by the Center for Democracy and Technology
(CDT), the authors identify five techniques used to detect content—user reporting, traceability, metadata analysis, perceptual hashing, and
predictive models. Although bucketed differently, these methods generally cover the same range of detection techniques discussed here, with the
exception of undercover operations. The CDT report provides a more detailed privacy analysis in the context of end-to-end encryption for readers
interested in learning more about that aspect. Seny Kamara, Mallory Knodel, Emma Llansó, Greg Nojeim, Lucy Qin, Dhanaraj Thakur, and Caitlin
Vogus, Outside Looking In: Approaches to Content Moderation in End-to-End Encrypted Systems, Center for Democracy and Technology, August
2021, https://cdt.org/insights/outside-looking-in-approaches-to-content-moderation-in-end-to-end-encrypted-systems/.
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components in turn determine the three possible types of technical solutions: device-related, serverrelated, and encryption-related solutions.71
“Device related” encompasses all solutions that operate on a user’s device; “client-side scanning”
is an example of a device-related solution.72 This includes “attachment notices” in email platforms,
in which the program cues on language in the email that suggests the user may have intended to
attach a document and prompts accordingly, as well as commonly used spam filters. It also refers
to an artificial intelligence or automated hash-scanning feature enabled to detect CSAM before the
user uploads or shares the content.
“Server related” solutions cannot be implemented in end-to-end encrypted environments because
the content of the communication must be decrypted on the server in order for the detection method
to run. This would allow a third party access to the content.
Not Strictly End-to-End Encrypted73
Some experts have proposed a few alternative solutions for detection that fall outside the
narrow conception of end-to-end encryption, yet provide more privacy and security than
many existing efforts.
1. Secure enclave (“middle box” or “end-to-end-to-end-to-end encryption”). This
method relies on an intermediate secure enclave where messages traverse between the
sender and recipient for detection of CSAM or other contraband.
2. Single server matching. This is where a full hash value is calculated on the device and
that value is sent to a server—managed by either the ESP or a trusted third party—for
matching.
3. Multiple third-parties matching. Based on multiparty computation, the device
calculates the hash value for the image, breaks it into parts, encrypts them, and sends
the parts to multiple third parties for partial matching through the ESP server, which
does not have access to the encrypted partial hashes.
“Encryption related” solutions rely on a homomorphic encryption scheme.74 The challenge is that
although this is possible, it currently takes about 10 to 15 seconds per image (contrasting with the
one-thousandth of a second that PhotoDNA currently takes), making it functionally prohibitive
given the volume of images transmitted across communication platforms. 75 Absent technological
improvements to this scheme, this is not a viable option.

71 European Commission, Technical solutions to detect child sexual abuse in end-to-end encrypted communications.
72 Although compatible with end-to-end encryption, client-side scanning has strong detractors who argue that it undermines security and results in
bulk intercept. See Hal Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin, Josh Benaloh, Matt Blaze, Jon Callas, Whitfield Diffie, Susan Landau, Peter G.
Neumann, Ronald L. Rivest, Jeffrey I. Schiller, Bruce Schneier, Vanessa Teague, and Carmela Troncoso, Bugs in our Pockets: The Risks of ClientSide Scanning, October 14, 2021, https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.07450.
73 European Commission, Technical solutions to detect child sexual abuse in end-to-end encrypted communications; Hany Farid, “An Overview of
Perceptual Hashing,” Journal of Online Trust and Safety 1, no. 1 (2021), https://doi.org/10.54501/jots.v1i1.24.
74 Farid, “An Overview of Perceptual Hashing.”
75 European Commission, Technical solutions to detect child sexual abuse in end-to-end encrypted communications, referencing Priyanka Singh and
Hany Farid, Robust Homomorphic Image Hashing, 2019.
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A. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IMAGE CONTENT ANALYSIS76

Artificial intelligence detection models rely on image classifiers to determine that the image is likely
CSAM.77 The primary advantage to this technique is that it can identify new material. Because
images can circulate throughout the internet ecosystem for some time before they are reported,
hashed, and added to a CSAM database, methods to detect new material are critical to cutting short
that time frame and limiting victims’ exposure to extensive dissemination.
Apple’s iMessage child safety feature, which is a device-based intervention, is a prominent example
of this intervention in practice. The device scans incoming and outgoing images using a classifier
intended to identify inappropriate content. Positive matches result in a warning to the child user that
they may be about to send or receive explicit content, and it prompts the user to affirmatively accept
or send the image in question.78 Google also uses machine learning classifiers to power its Content
Safety API, which helps companies identify potential new CSAM.79 However, as currently used, it
requires the identified content to be reviewed by human analysts, making this practice incompatible
with end-to-end encryption.
Artificial intelligence is often presented as a solution to any tech problem, but it is an evolving
technology, and in combating online CSEA in particular, three key challenges must be addressed.
1. Currently, AI lacks the necessary accuracy and reliability to be deployed in
environments that process a large volume of data.80 To create an accurate model, the AI must
be able to identify all the relevant elements of CSAM, which is challenging with the way image
classifiers are currently constructed.
2. The accuracy and reliability of AI to detect CSAM is further complicated by the lack of
training data. In the United States, there are laws that prohibit possession of CSAM, which
includes possession by for-profit companies and nonprofit organizations that would like
access only to train these models.81
3. Deploying an AI to detect CSAM in an encrypted environment is unpredictable because the
AI will certainly encounter data and images it has not previously encountered, and without
the ability to independently access the content, the validity of the model’s findings cannot be
confirmed.

76 For purposes of this report, artificial intelligence (AI) refers to a computer system or program that simulates human reasoning. “Machine learning”
uses algorithms and statistical models to analyze and draw inferences to generate an AI that is able to learn and adapt without explicit instructions.
77 For purposes of this report, a classifier refers to an algorithm that orders data into a set or sets of classes.
78 “Communication safety in Messages,” Apple, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.apple.com/child-safety/.
79 “Developing and sharing tools to fight child sexual abuse,” Fighting child sexual abuse online, Google, accessed September 24, 2022, https://
protectingchildren.google/#tools-to-fight-csam.
80 In discussing the artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques employed by a major social media company to identify abusive accounts
(i.e., accounts that engage in spam, scams, fake accounts), Levy and Robinson note that this “system exhibits an AUC of 0.90 which is excellent
(although limited in utility as a metric in this highly biased population context). The recall at precision 0.95 is 0.50, which is reasonable in general
and useful in the context the system is used. We do not believe that similar performance can be achieved on the child sexual abuse harm types, but
for the sake of argument, assume it can. These best-case performance measures seem inappropriate for the harm caused by child sexual abuse
cases. The reality in this case would be that the system would be 95% sure accounts flagged as abusive really were abusive, but it would only be
detecting 50% of the abuse on the platform. We expect that, in an operational context, no scaled platform would run a classifier at a precision of
0.95 due to the excessive error and so we would expect an operational precision around 0.99 with an attendant loss of recall. As in most machine
learning problems at scale, precision is critical for real world use” (bold in original). Levy and Robinson, Thoughts on Child Safety on Commodity
Platforms, 50.
81 At the time of writing, there are legislative proposals that may soften these restrictions, but whether those provisions are ultimately signed into
law, as well as the impact they would have if they were, remains unknown.
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4. The first two challenges—low reliability and lack of training data—feed one another. The best
way to improve accuracy and reliability of the model is by improving the data used to train it.
The Internet Watch Foundation is taking steps to make better data available to companies
interested in developing this detection method. Analysts are reviewing known CSAM and
layering additional metadata related to the content. The expectation is that using this kind of
metadata alongside the images will result in better-trained models.82
B. PERCEPTUAL HASHING

The most well-established method for detecting known CSAM is perceptual hashing, which is
the technology used in PhotoDNA. “Hash values” can be computed for any image.83 Although
technically more complicated, a “hash value” can be thought of as a digital fingerprint.84 And like a
fingerprint, its utility is limited to those situations where a comparator set is available. In the United
States, NCMEC manages several databases of hash values for confirmed CSAM in order to provide
this matching service, and some tech companies maintain their own hash sets. ESPs use these
comparator databases to automatically compare against the hash values of images uploaded and/or
shared to their services, thereby detecting “known” CSAM.
The Value of Detecting Known Images
If an image is “known”—that is, already identified as CSAM and included in the hash
database—it may seem to be “low priority” in terms of investigative resources. The victim
may even have been identified and removed from direct physical harm. However, detection
and removal of known imagery is still a necessary element of a comprehensive strategy to
combat online CSEA.
•

Many law enforcement representatives have reported that detection of only one known
image has often led to a cache of new imagery and/or active production involving a child
victim.

•

As outlined in part 2, the redistribution of known imagery continues to traumatize
victims, making detection and removal of even known images a valuable service.

This method has proved extremely accurate and fast, which is critical to making any technical
solution scalable.85 In a survey of online service providers regarding their trust and safety practices,
automated content scanning (which includes hash matching) was identified as the most useful
means of detecting CSAM.86

82 “IntelliGrade,” Internet Watch Foundation, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.iwf.org.uk/our-technology/intelligrade/.
83 Hash values can be calculated not only for still images, using methods such as PhotoDNA or Apple’s NeuralHash system, but also for videos, for
example using Google’s CSAI Match or Meta’s TMK+PDQF. See “PhotoDNA,” Microsoft, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.microsoft.
com/en-us/photodna; CSAM Detection: Technical Summary, Apple, August 2021, https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/CSAM_Detection_
Technical_Summary.pdf; Google, “Developing and sharing tools to fight child sexual abuse”; Antigone Davis and Guy Rosen, “Open-Sourcing
Photo- and Video-Matching Technology to Make the Internet Safer,” Meta, August 1, 2019, https://about.fb.com/news/2019/08/open-source-photovideo-matching/.
84 For a more technical discussion of the various permutations of automated hash scanning, see Levy and Robinson, Thoughts on Child Safety on
Commodity Platforms.
85 As Levy and Robinson state with respect to PhotoDNA, one of the perceptual hashes used to detect known CSAM, they “are aware of large-scale,
private testing of the PhotoDNA algorithm which suggests that, in a non-adversarial model, PhotoDNA has a false positive rate of around 1 in
50 billion. PhotoDNA was designed to be robust in the face of standard image manipulations and transformations. Under these conditions, its true
positive rate is greater than 99%.” Levy and Robinson, Thoughts on Child Safety on Commodity Platforms, 50–51.
86 Riana Pfefferkorn, “Content-Oblivious Trust and Safety Techniques: Results from a Survey of Online Service Providers,” Journal of Online Trust and
Safety 1, no. 2 (February 2022), https://doi.org/10.54501/jots.v1i2.14.
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Typically, ESPs run the hash value comparison on their own servers, which by its very nature cannot
occur with end-to-end encryption, as the hash value of the image is shared with a third party. As
a result, the industry-wide move toward end-to-end encryption significantly affects this detection
method. Apple introduced a privacy-preserving alternative with its proposed iCloud child safety
feature, which was later rescinded. With this feature, the hashing and scanning would have occurred
on the device rather than on the company’s server.87 Although Apple’s version could not work in an
end-to-end encrypted environment, on-device scanning of this nature could if it were coupled with
a response that did not provide the content to a third party. Using homomorphic encryption could
allow this detection method to operate within an end-to-end encryption scheme, but the technology
is not currently advanced enough to support that method at scale.
Although current iterations of PhotoDNA and other programs based on perceptual hashing cannot be
deployed in end-to-end encrypted environments, the technology itself can still be used to scan public
surfaces. For example, Project Arachnid, spearheaded by the Canadian Centre for Child Protection,
uses hash-matching technology to identify and remove CSAM from the open web. Although this
effort does not operate within end-to-end encrypted environments, by removing this content from
the open web, it is less likely to migrate into encrypted spaces.88
The Slippery Slope89
One argument that often arises in response to hash-matching methods is the “slippery
slope”—what is to stop authoritarian governments from including hash values in the
comparator database to identify dissenting propaganda, or malicious actors from hacking
the database and including hash values of innocent images to undermine the system’s
legitimacy?
In response to this argument, it is helpful to evaluate the track record of CSAM detection
in the United States. For more than a decade, ESPs have broadly used PhotoDNA and other
hash-matching technologies without any reports of “sliding” out of the narrow scope of
CSAM. This is relevant for two reasons.
First, CSAM—in particular, known and previously hashed imagery—is unique. Possession
itself is illegal in the United States.90 No other category of images is treated the same. The
other most commonly referenced “universal bad” is terrorism, but possession of terrorist
propaganda itself is not per se illegal. Given that the majority of large ESPs are based in
87 In the proposed plan, all images uploaded to iCloud would receive a “security voucher.” If a threshold number of positive matches to the known
CSAM database were detected in an account, the vouchers would be unwrapped, and a human moderator at Apple could review information
about the identified files, including a thumbnail image. Because some content would have been provided to a third party, this would have been
inconsistent with an end-to-end encryption scheme. See Apple, Expanded Protections for Children, August 2021, https://www.apple.com/childsafety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_for_Children_Technology_Summary.pdf.
88 For more information, see “Project Arachnid,” Canadian Centre for Child Protection, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.projectarachnid.
ca/en/. To understand the approach and impact in greater detail, see Canadian Centre for Child Protection, Project Arachnid: Online Availability of
Child Sexual Abuse Material: An analysis of CSAM and harmful-abusive content linked to certain electronic service providers, June 8, 2021, https://
protectchildren.ca/pdfs/C3P_ProjectArachnidReport_en.pdf.
89 For additional discussion on this topic, see “CSINT Conversations: Stopping online abuse of children – Could Apple have the answer?” recorded
January 21, 2022, Center for Security, Innovation, and New Technology, American University, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aKlSxDxb1kg.
90 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (any person who “knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view, any book, magazine, periodical,
film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material that contains an image of child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported
using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer,
or that was produced using materials that have been mailed, or shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer; [shall be punished according to this statute].”)
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the United States, the First Amendment provides broad protection to all other categories
of content.
Second, NCMEC triple-vets all images added to the database.91 This ensures no malicious
“insider threat” to the database. When paired with databases maintained by other sovereign
nations that impose similarly rigorous processes, this can help ensure that no “false
positives” are intentionally added.
The main limitation to perceptual hashing is that it detects only known imagery. As the volume of
newly created PFP content continues to grow, the impact of hash matching may decline, as there
may come a point when it does not detect the majority of CSAM on the internet. The Internet Watch
Foundation in the United Kingdom, in collaboration with the National Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children, has implemented “Report Remove,” a tool that allows youth to self-report selfgenerated content for inclusion in the CSAM databases.92 They are working with large social media
companies to promote this option for children concerned that their images may be shared without
authorization.
C. METADATA ANALYSIS

Metadata refers to information collected by ESPs about users outside of the users’ content (i.e., the
images and text that users send to one another). This may include subscriber information (e.g., userprovided age, user-provided email address), information collected from the device itself (e.g., IP
address, location data), and information about the user’s account (e.g., account username, account
avatar). ESPs can use this information to identify abusive account behavior and may elect to suspend
or deactivate the account based on this finding. For example, WhatsApp, an end-to-end encrypted
messaging application, uses machine learning classifiers, relying on unencrypted data and other
“signals,” to evaluate group behavior for suspected CSAM sharing.93 Facebook uses a classifier
to identify potentially harmful accounts, using signals from public profiles as well as predictive
nonpublic signals, such as group membership and group behavior.94
Metadata analysis is not the most effective technique to detect online CSEA. In a survey of service
providers regarding trust and safety practices, none of the respondents stated that metadata was
the “most useful” technique to identify child sexual abuse imagery, although some respondents felt
metadata was useful in detecting child sexual exploitation, which researchers defined as “other child
safety offenses such as grooming and enticement.”95 Unlike hash matching, which has a proven track
record, metadata analysis is conducted without the actual content of messages, making it difficult to
calculate false positive and false negative rates outside testing environments.
Furthermore, law enforcement officials report that, absent huge improvements in accuracy and
reliability, reports based on metadata alone will not be sufficient to establish probable cause to

91 For inclusion in the NCMEC hash database, an image must be triple-vetted by trained NCMEC staff members who confirm the image meets a series
of criteria. See “NCMEC, Google and Image Hashing Technology,” Safety Center, Google, accessed September 24, 2022, https://safety.google/
stories/hash-matching-to-help-ncmec/. The Canadian Centre for Child Protection has a similarly rigorous approach. Interview by author, May 12,
2022.
92 “Report Remove,” Internet Watch Foundation, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.iwf.org.uk/our-technology/report-remove/.
93 WhatsApp, “How WhatsApp Helps Fight Child Exploitation”; interview by author, November 10, 2021.
94 Interview by author, July 13, 2021; Antigone Davis, “New Technology to Fight Child Exploitation,” Facebook, Meta, October 24, 2018, https://about.
fb.com/news/2018/10/fighting-child-exploitation/.
95 Pfefferkorn, “Content-Oblivious Trust and Safety Techniques,” 16. In contrast, as discussed above, the majority of the survey respondents felt that
automated content scanning, such as hash matching, was most useful in detecting child sexual abuse imagery.
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support even a search warrant.96 Metadata-based reports can be compared to receiving a tip from
an unknown source—independent corroboration and substantiation would be required to pursue an
investigation.97 This limits the options (discussed below) of what companies can do once metadata
analysis indicates a harmful account.
D. TEXT-BASED ANALYSIS

Rather than scanning imagery to detect CSAM, text-based analysis moves the detection effort
upstream, seeking to identify patterns in text that suggest grooming or enticement. There have been
some successful efforts throughout the tech industry to pinpoint indicators necessary to identify
these categories of language. Microsoft spearheaded Project Artemis, initiated with a cross-industry
hackathon in 2018, which lead to the development of an anti-grooming tool built specifically to detect
enticement and solicitation of a child for sexual purposes.98 The accuracy of the tool is currently
about 88%, meaning there is a 12% false positive rate, which may limit its utility in high-volume
communications platforms.99 Facebook uses text-based classifiers in messages where at least one
party is a child in order to identify when the child may be getting uncomfortable; Facebook then
directs messaging to the child to provide resources for support.100
Whereas these text-based methods operate within a given platform or application, this technique
can also be used on a device. Safety tech firm SafeToNet developed an AI-powered smart keyboard
that can be downloaded to a child’s device to work across ICTs. It identifies indicators of abuse and
bullying, among other risky behaviors, and then prompts the child to help keep them safe.101 Content is
not shared with parents or any other third parties, making it compatible with end-to-end encryption.
Text-Based Analysis Outside End-to-End Encryption
This detection method is also used outside end-to-end encrypted spaces in an effort to
prevent abuse and exploitation before users move into encrypted environments.
•

Roblox uses text-based filters to prevent users from sharing sensitive information with
one another such as home addresses and other identifiers.102

•

YouTube regulates public comments that invite the content creator or other
commenters to produce or share CSAM.103

Any adult who has ever tried to keep up with language commonly used by children knows it can
feel like an insurmountable task; words and phrases used in popular slang one day are likely to be
dismissed as outdated the next. Therefore, it is imperative that any organization developing and
96 See, e.g., Levy and Robinson: “We believe that if implemented as suggested, AI and ML running on metadata alone will be unlikely to assist law
enforcement in stopping offenders and safeguarding victims, but will likely lead to a chilling effect on free speech, and infringement on user
privacy” (bold in original). Levy and Robinson, Thoughts on Child Safety on Commodity Platforms, 54.
97 Interview by author, August 18, 2021.
98 Jacqueline Beauchere, “Microsoft hosts tech industry hackathon to combat child online grooming,” Microsoft on the Issues (blog), Microsoft,
November 9, 2018, https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2018/11/09/microsoft-hosts-tech-industry-hackathon-to-combat-child-onlinegrooming/; C. Fisher, “Microsoft releases a free tool to fight online child abuse,” Engadget, January 9, 2020, https://www.engadget.com/2020-0109-microsoft-project-artemis-online-child-abuse.html; interview by author, July 1, 2021.
99 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual
abuse, May 11, 2022, 14, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022PC0209&from=EN.
100 Interview by author, July 13, 2021.
101 “Features,” SafeToNet, accessed September 24, 2022, https://safetonet.com/features/. SafeToNet is continuing to develop the keyboard
technology with a view to incorporating it into future versions of its solutions.
102 “Text Filtering,” Guides, Roblox, accessed September 24, 2022, https://developer.roblox.com/en-us/articles/Text-and-Chat-Filtering.
103 Interview by author, July 2, 2021.
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training an AI to detect enticement conversations collaborates closely with survivors and victims’
rights organizations to understand and stay updated on the nuances and coded uses of language.
The task of staying current is further complicated when acting in an end-to-end encrypted
environment because classifiers will be constrained by existing training data and may lack
sensitivity to evolutions in language patterns used by offenders. In less strict encryption schemes,
these tools can be audited and updated to reflect both natural and intentional changes, but that
access is unavailable in end-to-end encrypted environments.
Using text-based analysis as a detection method limits what companies can do next. Unlike
possession of CSAM, most language is subject to First Amendment protection. Exchanges can cross
the line into criminal enticement and extortion, but distinguishing between harmless trust-building
dialogue and harmful grooming and enticement conversations can be difficult, but also necessary
before reporting to law enforcement for investigation.
E. UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS

Law enforcement officials have relied on undercover operations to identify and ultimately prosecute
many CSAM offenders.104 Access to content (text or images) is necessary to establish probable
cause for search warrants and other investigative steps. When automated detection methods (i.e.,
AI image analysis, hash matching, metadata analysis, and text-based analysis) operate within
end-to-end encrypted environments, they cannot share detected content with third parties, which
means law enforcement is not given the information needed to pursue an investigation. Therefore,
in end-to-end encrypted environments, undercover operations are the only detection method that
can identify offender-to-offender CSAM dissemination (i.e., pattern I) and live online child sexual
abuse conducted by traffickers (i.e., pattern IV) in a format that can lead to criminal investigation
and prosecution.105
The primary limitation to undercover operations is how resource intensive they can be. Successful
undercover agents must cultivate a great deal of expertise to understand the cadence of these
encounters and the operations of the different platforms and apps. They must also devote a great deal
of time and cannot work traditional hours, instead making themselves available any time the targeted
offenders are meeting online. In the case of U.S. law enforcement, local and state officials report
feeling overwhelmed by the sheer volume of reports received from NCMEC, such that dedicating the
time necessary to engage in long-term proactive undercover operations is a challenge.106

104 See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, “U.S., South Korea dismantle secret online network that shared thousands of videos of child sexual abuse,” Washington
Post, October 16, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/us-south-korea-dismantle-secret-online-network-that-sharedthousands-of-videos-of-child-sexual-abuse/2019/10/16/cdae13c2-eb63-11e9-9c6d-436a0df4f31d_story.html; Don Morgan, “San Antonio Man
Sentenced to 28 Years in Prison for Producing Child Pornography,” KTSA, June 24, 2022, https://www.ktsa.com/san-antonio-man-sentenced-to28-years-in-prison-for-producing-child-pornography/; Michael Krafcik, “Vicksburg couple arrested in FBI child pornography raid,” WWMT, July 15,
2022, https://wwmt.com/news/local/fbi-vicksburg-sexual-explicit-children-federal-court-raid-chad-knowles-samantha-batts.
105 User reporting, discussed below, is the other detection method that can generate the evidence within end-to-end encrypted environments
necessary for law enforcement to pursue an investigation. However, user reporting relies on one user identifying a harm and reporting it, which
is why it is not an effective detection method in those situations where all parties knowingly engage in unlawful acts and would not want law
enforcement involved.
106 Interview by author, August 6, 2021; interview by author, August 11, 2021; interview by author, September 7, 2021; interview by author, September
15, 2021; interview by author, September 27, 2021.
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F. USER REPORTS

In end-to-end encrypted environments, platforms or applications cannot access the content of users’
communications without the consent of either the sender or the intended recipient(s). However, if a
party to the conversation opts to report the content as abusive, that practice does not violate the
encryption scheme, as the users themselves remain the locus of control.
A robust user-report ecosystem includes (1) sufficient tipline access globally, (2) easy-to-use in-app
or on-platform reporting functions, and (3) safe and reliable in-person reporting options.
Tiplines are a key component to user-reporting systems. There are regions of the world that generate
a large portion of CSAM but do not have the necessary reporting infrastructure. For example, the
vast majority of content reported by Facebook to NCMEC originates from and is sent to regions of the
world that lack the infrastructure to safely accept reporting, which instead results in nonmalicious
sharing (discussed in pattern I).107 Creating secure networks where users could report this content
could yield a dramatic decrease in the amount of CSAM that is disseminated out of outrage.
Several concerted efforts are underway to address these gaps.
• Tech Matters has built an open-source platform that improves the efficiency and efficacy of
helplines around the world.108
• InHope is working to expand its network to countries without helplines.109
• The Internet Watch Foundation has established reporting portals in some of the most needed
countries, representing approximately 2.5 billion people.110
When building and enhancing tipline infrastructure, it is necessary to couple these efforts with
community-specific education campaigns alerting people to these services. For example, Roblox
funds local nongovernmental organizations to create region-specific parental guides for its
platform.111 A similar approach can be taken alongside the launch of a tipline. Similarly, Meta created
a video for Facebook users explaining how sharing CSAM, rather than reporting it, compounds the
abuse to the victim. The company used classifiers to identify which accounts are most likely to share
this type of imagery and then directed the video message to them.112
All end-to-end encrypted services should have easy-to-use reporting functions that explicitly
permit users to report online CSEA. The Canadian Centre for Child Protection has developed
several recommendations to clarify and streamline the process for reporting CSAM. These include
(1) creating reporting categories specific to CSAM and online CSEA, (2) including CSAM-specific
options in easy-to-locate reporting menus, (3) ensuring reporting functions are consistent across
the platform, (4) allowing users to report content that is visible without creating or logging in to an
account, and (5) eliminating mandatory personal information fields in reporting forms.113

107
108
109
110

Interview by author, July 12, 2021.
“Aselo: Helping the World’s Children,” Tech Matters, accessed September 24, 2022, https://techmatters.org/project/child-helplines/.
“Report Box,” InHope, accessed September 24, 2022, https://reportbox.inhope.org/EN/escape-project.
“IWF Reporting Portals,” Internet Watch Foundation, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.iwf.org.uk/about-us/our-international-work/
reporting-portals/.
111 Interview by author, November 9, 2021.
112 Interview by author, July 13, 2021.
113 Canadian Centre for Child Protection, Reviewing Child Sexual Abuse Material Reporting Functions on Popular Platforms, 2020, https://www.
protectchildren.ca/pdfs/C3P_ReviewingCSAMMaterialReporting_en.pdf.
Protecting Children in the Age of End-to-End Encryption | Fall 2022

34

Reporting functions can help curb the nonmalicious sharing of CSAM and may provide off-ramps
to children who are being enticed or extorted into producing PFP content. Given the ubiquity
of technology, even hands-on abuse perpetrated by a relative or family friend is likely to involve
technology as the offender seeks to gain the child’s trust. This creates an opportunity for children to
self-report during these initial stages, so long as the reporting mechanism is easy, straightforward,
secure, and reliable.
Understanding Why Victims May Not Self-Report114
There are many reasons why child victims may not self-report abuse, especially when the
pattern of harm is either PFP content or child sex trafficking. Understanding the barriers
to a child’s ability and willingness to self-report, either within an app or platform or to a
trusted person, is absolutely essential for building effective tools that facilitate these
reports.
Here are a few reasons discussed by interviewees; they should not be considered mutually
exclusive or exhaustive.
1. The child may not consider the actions to constitute a “harm” that needs to be reported.
2. The child may realize the actions are harmful, but they may not want the offender to be
punished.
3. The child may not feel safe enough to report, fearing retribution by the offender or others.
4. The child may not know of a secure reporting mechanism.
5. The child may feel as though they have no one to talk to about it.
6. The child may feel a sense of shame.
7. The child may be concerned about their own exposure to criminal liability.
Even if a child is unwilling or unable to report abuse online, they may report the abuse in person,
either to a friend, a trusted adult, or law enforcement. One law enforcement official noted that while
they had never received a tip via NCMEC in which the child self-reported the harm to the website or
platform, they found it more likely that the child will tell a parent, sibling, or trusted adult, who will
then file a report (either with a tipline such as NCMEC or directly to law enforcement).115 To foster a
safe environment for children to make these reports, they need relationships with trusted adults who
know how to respond. Training for first responders, such as police officers, and mandatory reporters,
such as teachers and social workers, should be developed with input from survivors.116
***

114 Interview by author, February 1, 2022.
115 Interview by author, January 28, 2022.
116 Excellent references are available through NCMEC, ECPAT-USA, and the Canadian Centre for Child Protection. See “Training,” NCMEC, accessed
September 24, 2022, https://www.missingkids.org/education/training; ECPAT-USA, A Educator Guide to Online Sexual Exploitation and Human
Trafficking During COVID-19, accessed October 12, 2022, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/594970e91b631b3571be12e2/t/5eecec83d743f6
598d9f0133/1592585348040/Educator+Guide+to+Online+Exploitation.pdf; “Resources: Understand and Identify Child Sexual Abuse,” Canadian
Centre for Child Protection, accessed September 24, 2022, https://www.protectchildren.ca/en/resources-research/understanding-child-sexualabuse/.
The proposed Jenna Quinn Law would work to provide education and resources to adults who work with children in order to prevent child sexual
abuse and exploitation. To read more, see “The Jenna Quinn Law S. 924 Passed the U.S. Senate in 2020,” Jenna Quinn, accessed September 24,
2022, https://jennaquinn.net/the-jenna-quinn-law; “Support the Jenna Quinn Law,” Prostasia Foundation, accessed September 24, 2022, https://
prostasia.org/campaign/jenna-quinn-law/.
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Upon detection of online child sexual abuse or exploitation, the question becomes, what next?
Content—images and text—is necessary to pursue a law enforcement investigation, but there are
many steps short of that which companies can take to combat this problem.
The first four detection methods (AI, perceptual hashing, metadata analysis, text-based analysis) are
automated—the nature of the content is not assessed by a party to the communication but by some
technical means. As a result, detection of online CSEA through these methods cannot be reported
to a third party from an end-to-end encrypted environment. The latter two methods—undercover
operations and user reports—involve authorized access to the content, and therefore detection can
be reported without breaking the encryption scheme.
The following three categories of interventions—deter, refer, and disrupt—describe methods that
can be coupled with detection efforts. However, not all detection methods can be paired with each
subsequent option within end-to-end encrypted environments. Figure 14 (below) illustrates which
detection methods can connect with which subsequent purpose.
FIGURE 14: MATCHING DETECTION METHODS WITH FEASIBLE NEXT STEPS IN
END-TO-END ENCRYPTED ENVIRONMENTS

DETECT
AI image content analysis •
Hash scanning •
Metadata analysis •
Text-based analysis •
Undercover law
enforcement operations •
User reports •
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III. Deter
Deterrence may be a valid goal in combating online CSEA when it is directed at someone who
does not want to cause harm—that is, people who share the content nonmaliciously, potential
perpetrators, and/or victims (or potential victims) themselves. Within an end-to-end encryption
scheme, companies can issue warning notices to users following detection of high-risk behaviors
via artificial intelligence, hash matching, or text-based analysis.117 The language of these notices
will need to be carefully tailored to the intended audience. Companies that elect to implement this
type of deterrence effort should engage relevant stakeholders—including members of the target
group, communications specialists, and psychological experts if the audience is either potential
perpetrators or potential victims—during the drafting process.
SafeToNet’s smart keyboard provides an example of pairing text-based analysis with warning
notices.118 Content is not shared with third parties, parents included, but prompts are included on
the device for the child user. The program, which is compatible with all apps on the device, may
recommend different responses or provide resources to get support or assistance.119
Apple’s iMessage child safety feature is an example of pairing AI image analysis with warning
notices. As discussed above, this feature scans images sent or received by a device identified as
belonging to a child, looking for signals suggesting the image may contain nudity.120 Upon a positive
match, the app warns the child user, letting them know the image may contain explicit material and
asking them to affirmatively choose to either send or receive the image.121 The idea behind this is that
when a “speed bump” is put in place, it provides children the opportunity to reconsider their actions.
Parental Reporting
Early public announcements for Apple’s iMessage child safety feature (described above)
said it would send notices to users assigned as “parents” on the child’s family plan.122 These
notices would not have included content but only a notification that a child under age 13 with
this feature enabled overrode the “speed bump” and elected to view or send possibly explicit
content. Many parents agreed with the premise underpinning this component, which has
since been withdrawn, believing that such a provision properly places the onus on parents
to educate their children about appropriate conduct.
However, as one interviewee pointed out, there is no evidence to support the premise that
in the tech sphere, families are a safe space for children to discuss and/or report sexual

117 In theory, warning notices could also be provided if metadata analysis indicated that the account could be engaged in abusive behavior (e.g., by
forwarding an image too many times). However, unlike the other three automated detection methods, metadata analysis is more likely to take
into account a broader range of indicators and signals across the account—from account name and public-facing avatar to account behavioral
indicators such as forwarding and sharing—and it is not as likely that any one indicator will be sufficient to determine the account is involved in
online CSEA. As a result, timing and language of a warning notice could not be issued with any specificity.
118 As noted above, SafeToNet is continuing to develop the keyboard technology with a view to incorporating it into future versions of its solutions.
119 SafeToNet, “Features.”
120 Apple, “Communication safety in Messages.”
121 Apple collaborated with child psychologists to identify best practices in the messaging. However, there has been some criticism that the language
used may actually induce risk-taking, which further illustrates how finely tuned the language in warning notices must be. See Bennett Bertenthal,
Apu Kapadia, and Kurt Hugenberg, “Could Apple’s child safety feature backfire? New research shows warnings can increase risky sharing,” The
Conversation, September 28, 2021, https://theconversation.com/could-apples-child-safety-feature-backfire-new-research-shows-warnings-canincrease-risky-sharing-167035.
122 Apple, “Communication safety in Messages.”
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abuse.123 Perpetrators of hands-on sexual abuse of children are often family members
or other trusted adults, so it may not be correct to assume the plan-designated “parent”
represents a safe haven to the child.
Companies should carefully consider whether it is appropriate to incorporate parental
notices alongside these intervention techniques, as it may put the child at greater risk.
Warning notices may also be used on public-facing surfaces and unencrypted platforms to curb
risk. For example, Roblox includes warning notices on its unencrypted platform, cautioning users
from moving their conversations off Roblox to an encrypted communications application. These
warning messages are intended to prevent off-platform abuse.124 Facebook also issues warnings in
its unencrypted spaces, particularly encouraging child users to accept friend requests only from
people they already know. As Facebook moves toward fully encrypted messenger systems, these
types of warnings on public-facing areas may play a heightened role in preventing abuse.125
A similar approach could be paired with client-side hash matching. If Apple’s originally proposed
iCloud feature126 had warned the user that the content they sought to upload may be contraband
and that possession itself is illegal in most countries, rather than trigger a notice to the company,
the feature would not have raised as many privacy concerns. This sort of client-side scanning may
be effective in curbing nonmalicious distribution, especially if paired with educational messaging
directing the user to secure reporting functions, although it would not affect intentional offenderto-offender sharing.
However, unlike artificial intelligence analysis, the false positive rate of a hash match is negligible,
which raises ethical concerns regarding what a company could or should know about a user’s actions
by using this method but not reporting it. If a company could know that a user is in possession of
known CSAM, for example, by triggering the creation of a security voucher upon a positive match
like in Apple’s original proposal, what are the implications of the company’s choice not to? Currently,
having the ability to implement a technical solution to identify CSAM-trading accounts does not
correspond with legal liability, but it certainly raises the question about what ethical obligations a
company owes its users, including the victims of these crimes.

IV. Refer
Companies with search functions—such as Google, Microsoft, Facebook, and Apple—can identify
search terms related to child sexual exploitation and abuse used by either (potential) perpetrators,
(potential) victims, or someone who wants to file a related report.127 Relying on these signals, the
company can populate the search results with referrals to support services to intervene and
either prevent further offending, remove a child from an abusive situation, or direct the user to
reporting platforms.

123
124
125
126

Interview by author, January 12, 2021.
Interview by author, November 19, 2021.
Interview by author, July 13, 2021.
This is the feature discussed above, which has since been rescinded, wherein images uploaded from the user’s device to their iCloud account would
be scanned against a hash match database client-side, generating security vouchers accessible by the company only when a threshold number of
positive matches was reached. See Apple, Expanded Protections for Children, August 2021, https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_
Protections_for_Children_Technology_Summary.pdf.
127 Interview by author, July 1, 2021; interview by author, July 2, 2021; interview by author, July 13, 2021; “Expanded Protections for Children,” Apple,
accessed September 24, 2022; https://www.apple.com/child-safety/.
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There are excellent resources online where either (potential) perpetrators or (potential) victims
can receive support. However, in-person care may also be necessary, which requires investment in
community-based supports.

V.

Disrupt

“Disruption” in this context means to minimize the amount of CSAM circulating on the internet,
even if only for a short time, by restricting actions of the demand-side offenders and the producers.
There are three primary ways to pursue this goal: (1) investigate and arrest, (2) deplatform suspected
offenders, and (3) prevent the production and/or dissemination of CSAM.
A. INVESTIGATE AND ARREST

In many circumstances, a criminal justice outcome may be the most appropriate for offenders
involved in online CSEA, in particular for those offenders who produce CSAM, exploit or entice
children to create PFP content, and/or traffic children, either domestically or in the context of travel
and tourism. With end-to-end encryption, ESPs will not be able to provide the content of users’
communication to NCMEC as part of their ordinary reporting processes, which will greatly limit
law enforcement’s ability to rely on these reports to generate probable cause to open investigations
and obtain search warrants for abusive accounts. Because content is necessary for these aims, law
enforcement engagement will follow only from undercover operations or user reports in which the
user provides content or is willing to cooperate with the investigation.
This method of intervention in the patterns of harm is likely the most resource intensive,128 but
the commitment of law enforcement officials to pursue these investigations provides an important
deterrence effect, which may have ripple effects beyond those who are ultimately arrested and
prosecuted.
Arrest is not an appropriate outcome in every situation. Although the mere possession of CSAM
is criminalized in the United States, there are circumstances when arrest would not yield a just
outcome. For instance, children who create PFP content would be better served by referral to support
services, or people who share CSAM out of outrage may be warned about the impact of their actions
and directed to alternative ways to report the crimes.
B. DEPLATFORM ABUSIVE ACCOUNT

As private entities, ESPs can deplatform accounts that violate their terms of service, and they can
do so without raising First Amendment questions, so long as they do so pursuant to their own
policies and not as directed by the government.129 For detection methods that cannot provide
content, such as metadata analysis, this may be the most effective method of disruption, as it allows
companies to remove an account from their platform so that the account can no longer engage in this
harmful behavior.130

128 Interview by author, August 6, 2021; interview by author, August 11, 2021; interview by author, September 7, 2021; interview by author, September
15, 2021; interview by author, September 27, 2021.
129 See, e.g., Paul Levinson, “I’m a First Amendment scholar — and I think Big Tech should be left alone,” The Conversation, January 20, 2021, https://
theconversation.com/im-a-first-amendment-scholar-and-i-think-big-tech-should-be-left-alone-153287; Audie Cornish and Daphne Keller,
“Deplatforming: Not a First Amendment Issue, but Still a Tough Call for Big Tech,” January 26, 2021, Consider This from NPR, National Public Radio,
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/959667930.
130 WhatsApp reports that it bans more than 300,000 accounts per month on suspicion of sharing CSAM. WhatsApp, “How WhatsApp Helps Fight Child
Exploitation.”
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Although companies can deplatform a specific account based on suspicion of engaging in online
CSEA, nothing stops that user from creating a new account to engage in this behavior, either on
the original platform or on another. Complicating this is the fact that ESPs may be restricted from
sharing user data, including information about a deplatformed account, with one another, which
otherwise could prevent the user from creating an account on a different platform.131 For instance, if
Company A deplatformed an account with the recovery email address abc123@xyz.com, Company A
may not be able to share this information with Company XYZ, nor with any other ESP that may have
an account registered using the same email address.132
Ultimately, although assuming deplatformed users will jump to another platform or create a new
account, law enforcement officials have said that even this minor disruption is a step in the right
direction. This intervention can deter less tech-savvy offenders from continued engagement and
keep persistent offenders off-balance.
C. PREVENT CREATION AND/OR DISSEMINATION OF CSAM

The last permutation for disruption is to use technical means to either prevent the creation of CSAM
or prevent its dissemination.
To prevent the creation of CSAM, safety tech firm SafeToNet is developing prototypes of AI-enabled
threat detection, which when coupled with a device’s camera, could prevent the recording of CSAM,
either videos or still images. To date, the firm has demonstrated the tool’s potential to detect other
categories of harm and has started training the solution on CSAM.133 It expects that the tool will
ultimately be capable of detecting and preventing the recording and distribution of CSAM in real
time.
Project Arachnid & Removal Orders134
As discussed above under detection methods, the Canadian Centre for Child Protection
operates Project Arachnid, which has developed an API that companies can deploy to detect
and remove CSAM from their systems. This cannot be deployed in an end-to-end encrypted
environment, but by removing this content from the open web, it is less likely to migrate
into encrypted channels.
Detection methods, especially those with known high rates of reliability such as perceptual hashing,
could be deployed before the user uploads an image or shares the image via a messaging app. This
could occur either on a device before a user uploaded the image from the device to a particular app or
as part of a specific application’s processing procedures prior to encryption. ESPs could then impose
a gatekeeping function wherein they restricted users from sending or uploading photos that matched
a hash value from the CSAM database.

131 Interviewees in the United States referenced the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
18 U.S.C. § 2511, as two laws that prohibit ESPs from engaging in more proactive efforts to share account information among one another. There
may be liability carve-outs when it comes to sharing information in order to combat online CSEA, but absent explicit legislative approval to share
account indicators in these instances, companies are not likely to take the risk.
132 There are good privacy-preserving reasons to support this. For example, the email address that the original account holder used to register the
account may have been hacked, and a company sharing the information with other companies could further exacerbate the harm to the owner of
the hacked account.
133 Interview by author, August 11, 2021; interview by author, September 8, 2021; interview by author, October 12, 2022. For a panel interview that
featured Sharon Pursey, co-founder of SafeToNet, discussing this method, see International Justice Mission, “Day 3: Global Tech Innovations //
Global Resolve Against Online Sexual Exploitation of Children 2020.”
134 Interview by author, May 26, 2022. For more information, see Canadian Centre for Child Protection, “Project Arachnid.”
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Neither of these technical methods used to limit the supply of CSAM would directly support the law
enforcement process, because there would be no third-party notice. However, with respect to the
second technique, by restricting sharing, there would likely be a dramatic decrease in known CSAM
circulating within the internet ecosystem and a resultant decrease in reports to NCMEC. Law
enforcement officials have lamented the sheer volume of reports received via NCMEC, which often
results in Internet Crimes Against Children squads focusing exclusively on reactive investigations,
rather than proactive ones.135 By decreasing the quantity of known CSAM, law enforcement’s limited
resources could be redirected to focus on investigations of new content where children may currently
be in imminent physical danger.

135 Interview by author, August 6, 2021; interview by author, August 11, 2021; interview by author, September 7, 2021; interview by author, September
15, 2021; interview by author, September 27, 2021.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Adoption of end-to-end encryption will drastically diminish ESPs’ ability to detect and report CSEA
on their services. Given the serious harms that will occur absent timely intervention, companies that
elect to implement end-to-end encryption must consider what measures they will take to balance
these risks. But tech companies cannot solve the problem in isolation; governments and civil society
have important roles to play too, and they must work collectively to combat online CSEA.
These recommendations build on the experience and expertise of the interviewees who contributed
to this project, and fall into three primary categories. Policymakers should (1) improve the report-toprosecution pipeline, (2) engage relevant stakeholders, and (3) prioritize upstream efforts.

I.

Improve the Report-to-Prosecution Pipeline

End-to-end encryption does not explicitly interrupt the complex system that ultimately leads to
criminal justice intervention in online CSEA cases. However, because ESPs will no longer be able to
access the content of users’ communications, they will report far fewer cases to NCMEC, meaning
law enforcement will investigate, and ultimately prosecute, fewer cases. It is therefore necessary to
ensure that this system operates at peak performance to support these cases. Here are five specific
actions that policymakers can take to achieve this.
A. S
 ET INDUSTRY STANDARDS FOR DATA COLLECTION AND RETENTION BY TECH
COMPANIES

Even companies with strong reporting practices may not collect useful account indicators, or if they
do, they may not retain them for sufficient time. Interviewees said that even once a company files a
report to NCMEC, it may still subject the reported account data to the company’s standard retention
period, which in some instances is only thirty days. As described above in part 1, many steps must
occur before law enforcement officials are able to proactively investigate and seek additional
information from the reporting provider. Often, by the time law enforcement has prepared a search
warrant, the retention period has passed and the original account information has been purged from
the company’s system.
There are good reasons why the government should not impose specific data collection and retention
rules on tech companies. However, tech companies could seek to establish industry standards
as part of their work in various intra-industry collectives. They should take into account the law
enforcement process above and collaborate with law enforcement representatives in order to ensure
that whatever standards they identify will serve the intended purpose of better supporting law
enforcement efforts. With respect to data collection, ESPs should establish what data should be
collected for any account. This will vary by the type of service provided, but registration data and
certain metadata indicators would be an appropriate starting point. As for data retention, ESPs may
want to consider creating standards that apply only to those accounts that have triggered a report to
NCMEC, wherein that account data is moved to an encrypted repository and subject to a different
retention period. Companies could treat this data as they would data retained pursuant to a litigation
hold, walling it off from periodic deletion.
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B. CREATE UNIFORM CRITERIA FOR LAWFUL DATA REQUESTS TO TECH COMPANIES

Law enforcement officials often reported that to be successful in conducting this type of
investigation, they needed to know what rules to follow for each ESP when serving legal process
(e.g., subpoenas, search warrants). Even though the legal standard is the same, each company
imposes different rules and processes on law enforcement, which leaves the burden on law
enforcement to navigate the system and tailor each request for data based on the company.136 Law
enforcement reported that it relied heavily on personal connections with particular ESPs—an
identified point of contact whom it could call.
While a single point of contact is useful in theory, if the efficacy of the process relies on that
connection, then that person also serves as a single point of failure. Staff vacations or promotions,
for example, can disrupt the entire apparatus if ESPs do not have in place official policies and
practices for responding to law enforcement’s requests. One interviewee noted that despite
ensuring uniformity in search warrant language in order to obtain similar sets of data, they
received differently scoped replies based on who at the given company received and processed the
request. Creating industry standard practices would ensure consistency while still holding law
enforcement to the necessary standard of proof.
C. STREAMLINE LAW ENFORCEMENT’S REPORTING METHOD TO NCMEC

When an investigation reveals a cache of CSAM, law enforcement is expected to submit new images
to NCMEC for inclusion in the hash database. Unfortunately, at that stage in the investigation,
law enforcement likely has other, more time-sensitive matters to attend to, such as reviewing and
cataloging evidence and identifying victims. As a result, this report to NCMEC may get skipped.
Given the heavy reliance on the NCMEC-maintained database, it is crucial that it remains as up-todate as possible, which means creating a streamlined method to support this feedback loop.
D. ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR TRIAGING REPORTS

NCMEC sends reports to Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) task forces throughout the
United States. These task forces typically include representatives from police departments and
sheriff’s offices throughout the region as well as federal investigators, including the FBI and
Homeland Security Investigations. Each task force designates one or more people to review all
the reports received by NCMEC and triage them to focus resources. Triage decisions are often
based on perceived seriousness of injury, the estimated age of the victim, and whether the material
is new, thereby suggesting ongoing hands-on harm, as well as more mundane considerations,
such as appropriate jurisdiction or whether the report includes sufficient information to open an
investigation. Law enforcement officials typically rely on their experience to conduct this triage. The
development of more specific guidance or recommendations could provide a useful tool, especially
for officers new to investigating this type of offense.
NCMEC could aid in this process. Interviewees reported that it would be helpful to know upon
receipt of a report from NCMEC whether the content matches a known image in the database or is
new. If there were standard criteria that ICAC intake officers considered when triaging the reports,
those could also be included in the report from NCMEC to law enforcement.

136 To be clear, whenever law enforcement executes a request for data, it must meet the legal threshold. By proposing legal process standards across
the industry, that is only to streamline the workflow for law enforcement and not to diminish its burden of proof.
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Identifying key factors about a given image may become easier following completion of a project
managed by the Internet Watch Foundation. Funded by Thorn, the Internet Watch Foundation has
employed a handful of analysts whose sole responsibility is to “grade” images of CSAM received from
the repository held by the UK Home Office.137 The analysts layer contextual metadata and generate
unique hash values for each image. This information could be accessed by NCMEC analysts and
passed along to law enforcement to streamline the triage process.
E. ADDRESS VICTIMS’ NEEDS THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS

This work is hard, emotionally draining, and often overwhelming. Everyone involved in this
pipeline—from ESP content reviewers to NCMEC analysts to investigators to prosecutors to social
workers—experiences burnout. Yet interviewees reported high levels of satisfaction with their work
because they know they are making a difference in children’s lives. Centering the victims at every
stage of this pipeline is not only necessary to stay engaged in the work, but it is ethically necessary
given the inherent vulnerability of the victim population.
A few concrete actions can be taken to ensure victims remain centered. First, given the amount
of digital evidence in online CSEA cases, prosecutors may be tempted to rely on texts and images
rather than a victim’s testimony. For some victims, this might be preferable, as they may be reluctant
to testify and would prefer not to relive the trauma of the original victimization. However, for
others, this approach fails to take into account their need for reconciliation achieved through the
confrontational and adversarial court process. Prosecutors should therefore engage directly with
victims to understand what role they want to play in the process, while also connecting victims to
necessary social support services.
In some instances, it may be appropriate to seek the assignment of an attorney, client advocate,
or guardian ad litem who understands the system and can help the child navigate the process.
Advocating Opportunity, a nongovernmental organization in Toledo, Ohio, works directly with
trafficked and exploited persons, assigning both an attorney and client advocate to each client.138
Using a trauma-responsive care model, this team works consistently with the client until the
situation has been resolved or the client opts out of further services.
Victims often require ongoing support services that may outlast the criminal case. To the extent
possible, victims should be connected to victim compensation funds, and when legally viable,
financial restitution from the offenders should be sought. The Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child
Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018 (P.L. No. 115-299), signed into law in 2018, allows these
victims to receive a one-time payment of $35,000 from the Child Pornography Victims Reserve
within the Crime Victims Fund and also outlines restitution orders that can be placed upon
convicted offenders. Although the funds for the reserve have been allocated, regulations outlining
the process for victims to receive these one-time payments have not been finalized, blocking victims
from receiving much needed financial support.

137 Internet Watch Foundation, “IntelliGrade.”
138 To learn more about Advocating Opportunity, see http://www.advocatingopportunity.com/.
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II.

Engage Relevant Stakeholders

Policymakers must think broadly when identifying and engaging stakeholders. Firms outside
the typical “child safety” sphere can make meaningful efforts to combat this problem. A range of
stakeholders, including the tech industry, civil society, law enforcement, and beyond, can contribute
in myriad ways. There are four recommendations relating to assembling the right team.
A. IDENTIFY WHO CAN INTERVENE

For each intervention, it is critical to identify who has the power to implement the change. The nature
of the intervention will dictate the decision-maker.
In many cases, the interventions described above require action by the ESP—online safety education
for children, incorporation of safety-by-design principles, automated detection methods, warning
notices, referrals in search returns, deplatforming, and technical prevention of creation and
dissemination. However, many of these interventions will be most effective if they are developed
in concert with victims’ rights groups, psychologists, and educators. These parties with relevant
expertise should be brought in at the start of the development process.
Several intervention methods require action by civil society and local governments. Charitable
organizations can partner with local governments to establish community spaces for marginalized
youth. Public libraries and schools can support education efforts. Mental health departments can
ensure that services are available for the prevention of CSEA and to support victims.
Whenever an intervention is targeted at a population in a specific region of the world, policymakers
should partner with local experts to ensure regional specificity in language, tone, and messaging.
B. INVEST IN PARTNERSHIPS

One of the key themes that emerged from the research is that partnerships are essential in combating
online CSEA. These may be intra-industry partnerships, such as the Tech Coalition139 or ICAC
task forces,140 or interagency coalitions, such as the WeProtect Global Alliance141 and NCMEChosted roundtable events. These partnerships are necessary to keep the field nimble and support
coordinated tracking of emerging patterns and behaviors. It also allows for information sharing and
development of new and innovative solutions, such as those that have stemmed from child-safety
hackathons and open-source projects to improve CSEA detection technology.
Examples of innovation and promising practices stemming from strong partnerships include the
following:
• InHope, the International Association of Internet Hotlines (also known as tiplines), is a global
network of 50 hotlines where the public can anonymously report CSAM online. It operates a dataexchange platform and an integrated report-management system that is hosted by Interpol. This
139 The Tech Coalition is “an alliance of global tech companies who are working together to combat child sexual exploitation and abuse online.” It is a
membership organization composed of technology companies—large and small, old and new. To learn more, go to www.technologycoalition.org/
about.
140 The Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force Program is “a national network of 61 coordinated task forces, representing over 5,400
federal, state, and local law enforcement, dedicated to investigating, prosecuting and developing effective responses to internet crimes against
children.” To learn more, go to www.icactaskforce.org/.
141 The “WeProtect Global Alliance is a global movement of people and organisations” that “work together to transform the global response to child
sexual exploitation and abuse online.” WeProtect is a “public-private partnership” with participation from civil society, international organizations,
governments, and the private sector. To learn more, go to www.weprotect.org/alliance/.
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allows hotlines from different countries to instantly and securely share CSAM-related reports.
This is crucial for situations in which Country A receives a report that includes content hosted
in Countries B, C, and D. InHope’s system allows the tipline in Country A to seamlessly share the
relevant information with its peers in Country B, Country C, and Country D to facilitate the rapid
removal of CSAM from the internet.
• Zoom worked closely with NCMEC and the FBI to curb the troubling trend of CSAM meeting
disruptions, wherein offenders disrupted Zoom meetings with short CSAM videos, something
that cropped up at the start of the coronavirus pandemic. Zoom worked closely with an
international task force, spearheaded by the FBI, to identify offending accounts and gather
information necessary for legal process. Zoom also strengthened ties with NCMEC by building
an API so that once a user filed a report to Zoom, an analyst could immediately review it and
report it to NCMEC.142 Collectively, these efforts helped to effectively eliminate this problem.
C. LEVERAGE INCENTIVE STRUCTURES

For for-profit companies, a cost-benefit analysis will be conducted as part of any decision to
implement a new program or initiative. Many of the interventions identified may be costly and
resource intensive, especially for smaller or newer tech companies. There are external players who
can press on the scale to incentivize these companies to make decisions that will aid in the fight
against online CSEA. Even though the company leadership can decide whether or not to implement
any given intervention, certain incentive structures may serve as a powerful lever.
Financial services companies, such as Mastercard or Visa, can include language in contracts or terms
of service to tackle this issue. This nudge must be narrowly tailored to ensure it does not overextend
and negatively impact lawful and consensual activities.143
On-device app stores can play a similar function by requiring certain safety elements to be addressed
before an app is made available through that store. This could induce app developers to make safetydriven design decisions.
Investment companies and venture capital firms can also play an important role in setting standards
at the outset of a product’s development. For example, the eSafety Commissioner’s office in Australia
is engaging directly with the investment community to encourage the incorporation of safety by
design into investment criteria. By incentivizing the incorporation of these design principles at the
outset, new apps and platforms are more likely to lead with safety.
Lawmakers can motivate ESPs to take certain precautionary measures and safety interventions
through any number of statutory or regulatory changes. Tax benefits could be established for
companies that implement best practices in this area. Explicit liability carve-outs could be created
to permit ESPs to share account indicators with one another when an account is suspected of
engaging in online CSEA. Or an exception to the prohibition on CSAM possession could be narrowly
fashioned to permit tech safety researchers the opportunity to improve classifiers and other
detection technology.

142 Interview by author, September 23, 2021. For more information about Zoom’s efforts to combat meeting disruptions, go to blog.zoom.us/new-waysto-combat-zoom-meeting-disruptions.
143 The negative impacts of overly broad policies are widely documented. See, e.g., Issie Lapowsky, “OnlyFans shows Visa and Mastercard are ‘chokepoints’ of online speech,” Protocol, August 20, 2021, https://www.protocol.com/policy/onlyfans-visa-mastercard.
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These levers for change can also be combined. For example, creating national or international
standards for specific apps may leave regulators playing a virtual game of whack-a-mole as developers
create a roving range of available apps. If the focus of regulation is instead placed at the point of sale or
download—i.e., the app marketplace, such as Apple’s App Store or Google Play—then regulators may
have an opportunity to yield a greater impact. For example, app stores have age ratings for different
apps, but they are underenforced and inconsistent, and stores have promoted apps outside the user’s
stated age range.144 This is an area ripe for review by Apple and Google.
D. EXPLORE ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF SIGNALS

Financial institutions can incentivize responsible corporate decision-making, but they are also well
situated to flag early warning signs of behavior indicative of certain patterns of harm, specifically in
the context of travel and tourism and live-streamed abuse. Banks and international money-transfer
companies should work closely with law enforcement to identify behaviors indicative of CSEA. This
would likely be most effective in combating live online child sexual abuse and the sexual exploitation
of children in the context of travel and tourism. These offenses yield peculiar and specific moneytransfer activities, which could be helpful evidence to identify these offenders.
Additionally, as noted in the Luxembourg Guidelines, “[s]pecific travel/tourism actors in the circuit of
child sexual exploitation (such as hotels, travel agencies, tour operators, transportation companies,
airlines, bars, and restaurants) become, knowingly or not, intermediaries in the commission of these
offences, and can also play a role in their prevention.”145 Policymakers should invite these stakeholders
into the conversation and provide them with the information necessary to serve as good partners.

III. Prioritize Upstream Efforts
End-to-end encryption obscures the content of communications between offenders, so policymakers
need to make a greater investment in interventions that can break the patterns of exploitation and
abuse earlier in the process. These recommendations can be loosely grouped into community-based
opportunities and tech-based opportunities.
A. INVEST IN COMMUNITY-BASED OPPORTUNITIES

Several of the interventions discussed above designed to prevent exploitation and abuse are entirely
community-based efforts. These include building community spaces for marginalized youth,
providing comprehensive sex education and tech safety education, and supporting perpetration
prevention efforts. There are pockets of success that have built and sustained these programs, but
they need to be more widely adopted and institutionalized for broader impact.
Law enforcement professionals consistently remarked on how time- and resource-intensive
undercover operations are. To be effective in this type of investigation, officers require a great deal
of training, support, and technical know-how. Governmental decision-makers should make targeted
144 Canadian Centre for Child Protection, Reviewing the Enforcement of App Age Ratings in Apple’s App Store and Google Play, 2022, 3, https://www.
protectchildren.ca/pdfs/C3P_AppAgeRatingReport_en.pdf.
145 Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg Guidelines, 55.
ECPAT International called together an Interagency Working Group in 2014 with representatives from key stakeholders in the child safety space
and chaired by Professor Jaap Doek, former chair of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. Representatives in the Interagency Working
Group conducted an in-depth analysis of terminology and definitions for terms used to describe different forms of sexual exploitation and abuse
of children. The Terminology Guidelines for the Protection of Children from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, also known as the Luxembourg
Guidelines, represents the outcome of this initiative. The terms discussed in the Luxembourg Guidelines are “meant to be ‘universal’ and applicable
to work against these phenomena in all settings.” Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg Guidelines, 1.
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investments in these efforts. That is not to suggest that lawmakers should offer a blank check to police
to enhance broad surveillance efforts, but rather provide the units engaged in these investigations
with sufficient staffing, training, and support to be effective.
B. RESEARCH TECH-BASED INTERVENTIONS

Some tech-based opportunities can be deemed “low-hanging fruit” because they present low-cost
efforts that help address online CSEA. These include in-app online safety messaging targeted to
children; public awareness campaigns directed at populations most likely to share CSAM without
malicious intent; improved user-reporting functionality; and specific and directed warning notices
to deter users from escalating behavior. These efforts build on existing frameworks and can be
implemented without much additional investment.
Other opportunities require tech companies to make a larger investment. Specifically, because
end-to-end encryption blocks ESPs from identifying and reporting CSAM on their platforms, they
should build systems that will prevent it from entering and circulating in the internet ecosystem.
For example, tech companies can work collaboratively with researchers to craft new detection
programs, building on tech such as perceptual hashing and existing AI models, that could work as a
filter, restricting a user’s ability to upload known CSAM to an app or program. This could occur ondevice before an image is encrypted.146
Although AI technical solutions for threat detection, such as the in-camera program in development
by SafeToNet, remain in the testing and development stage, this sort of creative application is another
opportunity for tech companies to invest in to help prevent the production of CSAM.

146 ESPs would likely want to create an appeals process wherein users could submit the photo they were restricted from sending and a human
reviewer, upon assessing no violation, could tag the content as approved so the issue would not crop up again for that particular image. Given that
only users with true false positives would submit an image using this process, it should not overwhelm human moderation teams.
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APPENDIX 1: TERMINOLOGY
Definitions and explanations for terms are included here and are widely drawn from the Luxembourg
Guidelines, the U.S. Criminal Code, scholarly reports, and experts in the field. Disagreements
between those sources are noted.
• Child Pornography
The U.S. Criminal Code defines this term as “any visual depiction, including any photograph, film,
video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced
by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where—(A) the production
of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; (B)
such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image that is, or
is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) such visual
depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.”147
The Luxembourg Guidelines, along with experts in this field, discourage the use of this term
altogether. They suggest that “sexualised material that depicts or otherwise represents children
is indeed a representation, and a form, of child sexual abuse, and should not be described as
‘pornography’. Pornography is a term primarily used for adults engaging in consensual sexual acts
distributed (often legally) to the general public for their sexual pleasure. Criticism of this term in
relation to children comes from the fact that ‘pornography’ is increasingly normalised and may
(inadvertently or not) contribute to diminishing the gravity of, trivialising, or even legitimising what
is actually sexual abuse and/or sexual exploitation of children.”148
To the extent this term is used throughout this report, it is only in connection to the language used
in the U.S. Criminal Code.
• Child Sex Trafficking
Under the U.S. Criminal Code, this offense is referred to as “sex trafficking of children or by force,
fraud, or coercion” and is defined as knowingly “recruit[ing], entic[ing], harbor[ing], transport[ing],
provid[ing], obtain[ing], advertis[ing], maintain[ing], patroniz[ing], or solicit[ing] by any means”
a person who “has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial
sex act.”149 As a federal offense, jurisdiction is established when the described actions occur in or
affect interstate or foreign commerce, but this does not require that the child is physically moved,
as the common understanding of “trafficking” would otherwise suggest. Instead, as explained in
the Luxembourg Guidelines, “a consistent feature of ‘trafficking’ under international law is that its
purpose is the exploitation of a human being (in this case the child).”150
This term is used to describe the actions that may otherwise be known as “sexual exploitation of
children in/for prostitution” or “child prostitution,” the former of which is actually the preferred term
suggested by the Luxembourg Guidelines. “This form of exploitation consists of a child performing a

147
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18 U.S.C. § 2256(8).
Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg Guidelines, 38–39.
18 U.S.C. § 1591.
Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg Guidelines, 60.
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sexual act in exchange for (a promise of) something of value (money, objects, shelter, food, drugs, etc).
It is not necessarily the child who receives the object of exchange, but often a third person. Moreover,
it is not necessary that an object of exchange is actually given; the mere promise of an exchange
suffices, even if it is never fulfilled.”151 The Luxembourg Guidelines go on to explain the concerns
with the term “child prostitution,” as it “may arguably be interpreted in a manner to imply that the
phenomenon represents a legitimate form of sex work or that the child has given her/his informed
consent to prostitute her/himself.”152
Interviewees argued that the inclusion of the word “prostitution” to describe this offense, even when
used in conjunction with “exploitation,” should be avoided entirely, as it suggests the child could
consent to the arrangement, which is legally dissonant.
• Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM)
This term is typically used to replace what has otherwise been known as “child pornography,” due
to the widely accepted argument that “sexualised material that depicts or otherwise represents
children is indeed a representation, and a form, of child sexual abuse.”153 For the reasons discussed
above, the latter term is no longer accepted among child safety advocates and law enforcement
officials who work in this field.
There is some disagreement about whether CSAM is the most accurate term or whether “child sexual
exploitation material” (CSEM) better encapsulates the range of material previously understood to be
“child pornography.” In particular, the concern is that CSAM applies more narrowly to those images
that depict an act of sexual abuse against a child and that it does not extend to include images that
sexualize and exploit a child but do not explicitly depict abuse.154
Despite the fact that CSEM may better describe the images at the core of this issue, CSAM is a more
broadly accepted term. Therefore, when used throughout this report, it is intended to cover the
broader category of harmful imagery.
• Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (CSEA)
As with CSAM and CSEM, there is nuance in the difference between child sexual abuse and child
sexual exploitation. As the Luxembourg Guidelines state: “The [UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child] does not make clear what the distinction is [between the two terms]. However, it is noteworthy
that the sexual abuse of children requires no element of exchange and can occur for the mere purpose
of the sexual gratification of the person committing the act, whereas the sexual exploitation of
children can be distinguished by an underlying notion of exchange.”155 It is also important to note
that sexual abuse and/or exploitation requires neither physical contact nor explicit force.
Complicating the matter is the fact that the U.S. federal crime of “sexual exploitation of children”
includes actions that do not require an element of exchange—the feature articulated as distinguishing
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Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg Guidelines, 29.
Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg Guidelines, 30.
Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg Guidelines, 38.
For a discussion of this, see Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg Guidelines, 39, citing Danijela Frangež, Anton Toni Klančnik, Mojca Žagar
Karer, Bjørn-Erik Ludvigsen, Jarosław Kończyk, Fernando Ruiz Perez, Mikko Veijalainen, and Maurine Lewin, “The Importance of Terminology
Related to Child Sexual Exploitation,” Journal of Criminal Investigation and Criminology 66, no. 4 (2015): 296.
155 Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg Guidelines, 18, referencing Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN General Assembly, November 20,
1989.
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the terms in the Luxembourg Guidelines. Under U.S. law, “[a]ny person who employs, uses, persuades,
induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in … any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of
producing any visual depiction of such conduct” is subject to criminal liability under this statute.156
Given the discrepancies in definitions and the idea that the two terms are ultimately communicating
similar ideas, this report treats them collectively unless otherwise delineated.
• Demand-Side Offender
This term was recommended by interviewees to describe the offender who engages in child sexual
abuse and/or exploitation for the offender’s own sexual gratification. This is in contrast to someone
who may produce such imagery for commercial gain.
• Distribution
Under U.S. law, CSAM-related offenses are often bucketed in the following way, with increasing
penalties attached: (1) possession, (2) receipt and/or distribution, and (3) production. While
possession and receipt have commonly understood definitions,157 distribution is legally broader than
one might expect. It includes actively sending the images to another but also may include providing
someone access to them, for instance via a shared file system.158
• Grooming
“In the context of child sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, ‘grooming’ is the short name for the
solicitation of children for sexual purposes. ‘Grooming/online grooming’ refers to the process of
establishing/building a relationship with a child either in person or through the use of the Internet
or other digital technologies to facilitate either online or offline sexual contact with that person”
(emphasis in original).159 The Luxembourg Guidelines continue, stating that “‘[g]rooming’ has
sometimes also been defined as ‘online enticement of children for sexual acts’. ‘Enticement’ refers to
something used to attract or tempt someone, which indeed reflects a common way of proceeding of
the person ‘grooming’ a victim with the aim of sexually exploiting her/him” (emphasis in original).160
Whereas “grooming” is not found in the U.S. Criminal Code, “enticement” is used throughout the
sections related to child sexual abuse and/or exploitation. “Coercion and enticement” are explicitly
listed as an offense, creating liability for “[w]hoever … knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or
coerces any [minor] to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity.”161
There are two primary issues to consider with the term “grooming.” First, it has been coopted by
some to mean something much broader, including adults normalizing conversations around sexual
orientation and/or gender identity.162 That conflation undermines its meaning in the context of
child sexual abuse and exploitation. Second, “grooming” as defined here still encompasses a wide

156 18 U.S.C. § 2251(c).
157 “Production” in this context is discussed below.
158 See, e.g., United States v. Stitz, 877 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2017) (“We now take this opportunity to join our sister circuits and hold that where files
have been downloaded from a defendant’s shared folder, use of a peer-to-peer file-sharing program constitutes ‘distribution’ pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A.”)
159 Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg Guidelines, 51.
160 Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg Guidelines, 52.
161 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).
162 See, e.g., Hannah Natanson and Moriah Balingit, “Teachers who mention sexuality are ‘grooming’ kids, conservatives say,” Washington Post, April
5, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2022/04/05/teachers-groomers-pedophiles-dont-say-gay/.
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range of behavior and may extend from compliments and rapport building, which would likely be
constitutionally protected speech, to enticement or inducement to take sexually explicit images,
which is a crime.
Given the complicated nature of the term, throughout this report it is coupled with clarifying
language to ensure consistent understanding.
• Hash Value
“Hash values” are typically understood to be the digital equivalent of a fingerprint—believed to be
unique—and their value resides in the ability to compare them against a known set of comparators.
“Hashing is arguably the most widely used technology for limiting the spread of previously identified
multimedia content. … After an offending audio, image, or video is identified (either manually
or automatically), a distinct digital signature is extracted from the content. … The same hash is
extracted from each future upload and compared against a database of offending hashes. … Any
matched content can, for example, be automatically blocked from upload or subjected to any policy
a service provider initiates. … In the digital realm, hashing refers to chopping a data file into small
pieces and combining them to yield a concise numeric value that can be used to identify the original
data file.”163 This is the technology used in PhotoDNA and many other automated CSAM detection
methods.
• Live Online Child Sexual Abuse
“[L]ive online child sexual abuse often represents a dual abuse of the child. She/he is coerced to
participate in sexual activities, alone or with other persons—an act that already constitutes sexual
abuse. The sexual activity is, at the same time, transmitted live through ICT and watched by others
remotely. Often, the persons watching remotely are the persons who have requested and/or ordered
the sexual abuse of the child, dictating how the act should be carried out …, and those persons may
be paying for the abuse to take place. Live online child sexual abuse has been observed to take on
both commercial and non-commercial forms, and there are cases where it has been set up as a
proper business with the only apparent objective being to make money out of the sexual exploitation
of the children involved.”164 The Luxembourg Guidelines make the important observation that the
“fact that live child sexual abuse can now occur online through the use of ICTs does not mean the
phenomenon as such is new. What is new, however, is the fact that such sexual abuse can now be
carried out ‘remotely’ with the perpetrator viewing the abuse possibly in a different country than
that of the victim.”165
• National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC)
NCMEC’s “mission is to help find missing children, reduce child sexual exploitation, and prevent
child victimization,” and it serves as the United States’ clearinghouse and reporting center for all
issues related to the sexual exploitation and abuse of children.166 NCMEC holds a fairly unique
legal status in that it is a private, nonprofit 501(c)(3) corporation, but it was established by statute.
Furthermore, ESPs are mandated under U.S. law to “as soon as reasonably possible after obtaining
actual knowledge of any facts or circumstances” from which there is an “apparent violation” of one
163
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Farid, “An Overview of Perceptual Hashing.”
Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg Guidelines, 46–47.
Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg Guidelines, 47.
“About Us,” NCMEC, accessed October 12, 2022, https://www.missingkids.org/footer/about.
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of the enumerated offenses involving CSAM, make a report to NCMEC.167 NCMEC is then, in turn,
mandated to make each report available to law enforcement.168
Courts have issued mixed opinions on whether to classify NCMEC as a government agent or entity,
which can have Fourth Amendment implications.169 Although courts have uniformly held that ESPs
qualify as “private actors” when they search for and detect CSAM on their networks, despite the
mandatory reporting requirement, NCMEC falls into a grayer area.170
• Perceived First Person (PFP) CSAM
In June 2021, the Tech Coalition suggested using the term “perceived first person CSAM,” as opposed
to the widely adopted “self-generated CSAM,”171 arguing that “self-generated” may imply agency
by the child, thereby inferring blame. For “PFP CSAM,” the Tech Coalition suggests the following
definition: “Sexualized visual depictions of a child that are generated without the full knowledge,
consent, and participation (for example, coercion, blackmail or grooming) of the child and without
the physical presence of an instigator AND/OR that may have been originally voluntarily produced
by the minor child, but then is distributed to or shared with others without the child’s full knowledge
and consent.”172 It also noted that consent “should not be limited to legal capacity to consent to sexual
activity in any particular jurisdiction, but should reflect the age-appropriated state of mind of the
subject and should take into account if the generation was coerced.”173
Although both terms are used by experts in the field, the default throughout this report will be
perceived first person CSAM to better encapsulate the nuanced view articulated by the Tech
Coalition.
• Production
As discussed above in the context of “distribution,” “production” in the context of online child sexual
abuse and/or exploitation has a specific meaning. The U.S. Criminal Code defines “producing” as
“producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing, or advertising.”174 The term is generally
167 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a). The report must include contact information for the provider, but all other content in the report is left to the sole discretion of
the provider. 18 U.S.C. 2258A(b).
168 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(c).
169 See, e.g., United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1308 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that NCMEC is a governmental entity or agent) (Gorsuch, J.),
but see United States v. Ackerman, 804 F. App'x 900, 903 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 458 (2020) (affirming the district court’s decision to
deny the motion to suppress because the court correctly determined that NCMEC searched defendant’s email in good faith, and noting that at
the time of the search, no court had yet held that NCMEC was a government actor). See also United States v. Meals, 21 F.4th 903, 908 (5th Cir.
2021) (cert. pet. filed May 26, 2022) (“Contrary to [defendant’s] supposition, NCMEC is a private, nonprofit corporation, not a government entity.
The government takes no position on this question, and like the district court, we need not do so either. But assuming arguendo that NCMEC is
a government agent, NCMEC did not exceed the scope of Facebook’s search by merely reviewing the identical evidence that Facebook reviewed
and placed in a cyber tip.”); United States v. Ringland, 966 F.3d 731, 737 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2797 (2021) (“[W]e need not decide
whether NCMEC is a government agency or whether it expanded its search beyond Google’s search.”); United States v. Powell, 925 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
2018) (noting that the parties do not dispute that NCMEC was acting as a governmental entity or agent for all relevant purposes).
170 See, e.g., United States v. Rosenow, 33 F.4th 529, 541 (9th Cir. 2022); United States v. Bebris, 4 F.4th 551, 562 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 489
(2021) (affirming district’s finding that Facebook did not act as a government agent in sending a CyberTip to NCMEC upon finding that defendant had
sent child pornography on its platform); United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2013) (“A reporting requirement, standing alone, does
not transform an Internet service provider into a government agent whenever it chooses to scan files sent on its network for child pornography.”);
United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 638 (1st Cir. 2012).
171 Self-generated CSAM is defined as “[e]xplicit imagery of a child that appears to have been taken by the child in the image. This imagery can result
from both consensual or coercive experiences. Kids often refer to consensual experiences as ‘sexting’ or ‘sharing nudes.’” Thorn, Self-Generated
Child Sexual Abuse Material: Attitudes and Experiences: Complete findings from 2019 qualitative and quantitative research among 9–17 year olds and
caregivers, August 2020, https://www.thorn.org/resources-and-research/.
172 Tech Coalition, Multi-Stakeholder Forum: Charting a Collective Path Forward, June 2021, www.technologycoalition.org/knowledge-hub/this-is-testknowledge-3.
173 Tech Coalition, Multi-Stakeholder Forum: Charting a Collective Path Forward.
174 18 U.S.C. § 2256(3).
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used in this context to refer to the actual recording of the child sexual abuse and/or exploitation as
videos or photos.
• Sexual Exploitation of Children in the Context of Travel and Tourism
“The term ‘sexual exploitation of children in (the context of) travel and tourism’ refers to sexual
exploitation of children that is embedded in a context of travel, tourism, or both. The offence can be
committed by either foreign or domestic tourists and travellers and longer-term visitors. … The term
… is used as an alternative to the broadly used term ‘child sex tourism’. It focuses on the fact that the
child is being sexually exploited, and that such exploitation occurs within a specific context.”175
• Trafficker
In contrast to “demand-side offender,” defined above, interviewees recommended that “trafficker”
be used to describe an individual who aids, facilitates, and/or coordinates the hands-on abuse or
CSAM production, often with commercial motivation. That is not to say that the trafficker may not
also sexually abuse the child, but that their role is typically distinct.

175 Interagency Working Group, Luxembourg Guidelines, 55.
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APPENDIX 2: RELEVANT U.S. STATUTES
I.

CSAM Production and Distribution

18 U.S.C. § 2252. Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of
minors
a. Any person who—
1. knowingly transports or ships using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce …
by any means including by computer or mails, any visual depiction,176 if—
A. the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor177 engaging in sexually
explicit conduct; and
B. such visual depiction is of such conduct;
2. knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction [using any means affecting interstate
or foreign commerce], if—
A. the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct; and
B. such visual depiction is of such conduct;
3. either—
A. [within U.S. jurisdiction], knowingly sells or possesses with intent to sell any visual
depiction; or
B. knowingly sells or possesses with intent to sell any visual depiction that has been mailed,
shipped, or transported [by any means affecting interstate or foreign commerce], if—
i. the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct; and
ii. such visual depiction is of such conduct; or
4. either—
A. [within U.S. jurisdiction], knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view,
[materials] which contain any visual depiction; or
B. knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view, [material] which contain
any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported [by any
means affecting interstate or foreign commerce], if—

176 “‘[V]isual depiction’ includes undeveloped film and videotape, data stored on computer disk or by electronic means which is capable of conversion
into a visual image, and data which is capable of conversion into a visual image that has been transmitted by any means, whether or not stored in a
permanent format.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(5).
177 “‘[M]inor’ means any person under the age of eighteen years.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1).
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i. the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct; and
ii. such visual depiction is of such conduct;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
b. (1) W hoever violates, or attempts or conspires to violate,
paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not
less than 5 years [and not more than 40 years].
(2) W
 hoever violates, or attempts or conspires to violate, paragraph (4) of subsection (a) shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than [20 years].

18 U.S.C. § 2252A. Certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child
pornography
a. Any person who—
1. knowingly mails, or transports or ships using any means or facility of interstate or foreign
commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by
computer, any child pornography;
2. knowingly receives or distributes—
A. any child pornography using any means [affecting interstate or foreign commerce]; or
B. any material that contains child pornography using any means [affecting interstate or
foreign commerce];
3. knowingly—
A. reproduces any child pornography for distribution [by means affecting interstate or
foreign commerce]; or
B. advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the mails, or using any
means [affecting interstate or foreign commerce] any material or purported material in
a manner that reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the
material or purported material is, or contains—
i. an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or
ii. a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
4. either—
A. [within U.S. jurisdiction], knowingly sells or possesses with the intent to sell any child
pornography; or
B. knowingly sells or possesses with the intent to sell any child pornography that has been
mailed, or shipped or transported [in a manner affecting interstate or foreign commerce];
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5. either—
A. [within U.S. jurisdiction], knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view,
[any material] that contains an image of child pornography; or
B. knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to view, [any material] that
contains an image of child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported
[in a manner affecting interstate or foreign commerce]; [or]
…
7. knowingly produces with intent to distribute, or distributes, by any means [affecting
interstate or foreign commerce], child pornography that is an adapted or modified depiction of
an identifiable minor.
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
b. (1) W hoever violates, or attempts or conspires to violate,
paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4) … of subsection (a) shall be fined under this title and imprisoned
not less than 5 years [and not more than 40 years].
(2) W
 hoever violates, or attempts or conspires to violate, subsection (a)(5) shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than [20 years].
(3) W hoever violates, or attempts or conspires to violate, subsection (a)(7) shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.

II.

 erceived First Person Material Production and
P
Distribution

18 U.S.C. § 2251. Sexual exploitation of children
a. A
 ny person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage
in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States,
with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of
producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual
depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person
knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted [in a
manner affecting interstate or foreign commerce].
b. A
 ny parent, legal guardian, or person having custody or control178 of a minor who knowingly
permits such minor to engage in, or to assist any other person to engage in, sexually explicit
conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose
of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct shall be punished as provided under
subsection (e) of this section, if such parent, legal guardian, or person knows or has reason to
know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted [using any means affecting
178 “‘[C]ustody or control’ includes temporary supervision over or responsibility for a minor whether legally or illegally obtained.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(7).
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interstate or foreign commerce].
c. (1) Any person who, in a circumstance described in paragraph (2), employs, uses, persuades,
induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other
person to engage in, any sexually explicit conduct outside of the United States, its territories
or possessions, for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct, shall be
punished as provided under subsection (e).
(2) The circumstance referred to in paragraph (1) is that—
A. the person intends such visual depiction to be transported to the United States, … by any
means …; or
B. the person transports such visual depiction to the United States, … by any means … .
…
e.	Any individual who violates, or attempts or conspires to violate, this section shall be fined under
this title and imprisoned not less than 15 years [nor more than life].

18 U.S.C. § 2252A. Certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child
pornography
a. Any person who—
…
6. knowingly distributes, offers, sends, or provides to a minor any visual depiction … where such
visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct—
A. that has been mailed, shipped, or transported [by means affecting interstate or foreign
commerce];
B. that was produced using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported [by
means affecting interstate or foreign commerce]; or
C. which distribution, offer, sending, or provision is accomplished using the mails or any
means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce,
for purposes of inducing or persuading a minor to participate in any activity that is illegal;
…
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
b. (1) W hoever violates, or attempts or conspires to violate,
paragraph … (6) of subsection (a) shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 5
years [and not more than 40 years].
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U.S.C. § 2422. Coercion and enticement
…
b.	Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce, … knowingly
persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years,
to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a
criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less
than 10 years or for life.

III. Internet-Enabled Domestic Child Sex Trafficking
18 U.S.C. § 1591. Sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion
a. Whoever knowingly—
1. [in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce], recruits, entices, harbors, transports,
provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a person; or
2. benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which
has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1),
knowing, or, except where the act constituting the violation of paragraph (1) is advertising, in
reckless disregard of the fact, … that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be
caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
b. The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) is—
1. … if the person recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, advertised,
patronized, or solicited had not attained the age of 14 years at the time of such offense, by a
fine under this title and imprisonment for any term of years not less than 15 or for life; or
2. if … the person recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, advertised,
patronized, or solicited had attained the age of 14 years but had not attained the age of 18 years
at the time of such offense, by a fine under this title and imprisonment for not less than 10
years or for life.
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18 U.S.C. § 2251. Sexual exploitation of children
…
d.
1. Any person who, in a circumstance described in paragraph (2), knowingly makes, prints, or
publishes, or causes to be made, printed, or published, any notice or advertisement seeking or
offering—
A. to receive, exchange, buy, produce, display, distribute, or reproduce, any visual depiction,
if the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct and such visual depiction is of such conduct; or
B. participation in any act of sexually explicit conduct by or with any minor for the purpose of
producing a visual depiction of such conduct;
shall be punished as provided under subsection (e).
2. The circumstance referred to in paragraph (1) is that—
A. such person knows or has reason to know that such notice or advertisement will be
transported using any means [affecting interstate or foreign commerce]; or
B. such notice or advertisement is transported using any means [affecting interstate or
foreign commerce].
e.	Any individual who violates, or attempts or conspires to violate, this section shall be fined under
this title and imprisoned not less than 15 years [nor more than life].

18 U.S.C. § 2251A. Selling or buying of children
a. A
 ny parent, legal guardian, or other person having custody or control of a minor who sells or
otherwise transfers custody or control of such minor, or offers to sell or otherwise transfer
custody of such minor either—
1. with knowledge that, as a consequence of the sale or transfer, the minor will be portrayed
in a visual depiction engaging in, or assisting another person to engage in, sexually explicit
conduct; or
2. with intent to promote either—
A. the engaging in of sexually explicit conduct by such minor for the purpose of producing any
visual depiction of such conduct; or
B. the rendering of assistance by the minor to any other person to engage in sexually explicit
conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct;
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 30 years or for life and by a fine under
this title, if any of the circumstances described in subsection (c) of this section exist.
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b.	Whoever purchases or otherwise obtains custody or control of a minor, or offers to purchase or
otherwise obtain custody or control of a minor either—
1. with knowledge that, as a consequence of the purchase or obtaining of custody, the minor
will be portrayed in a visual depiction engaging in, or assisting another person to engage in,
sexually explicit conduct; or
2. with intent to promote either—
A. the engaging in of sexually explicit conduct by such minor for the purpose of producing any
visual depiction of such conduct; or
B. the rendering of assistance by the minor to any other person to engage in sexually explicit
conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct;
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 30 years or for life and by a fine under
this title, if any of the circumstances described in subsection (c) of this section exist.
c. The circumstances referred to in subsections (a) and (b) are that—
1. in the course of the conduct described in such subsections the minor or the actor traveled in or
was transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce;
2. any offer described in such subsections was communicated or transported using any means or
facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by
any means including by computer or mail; or
3. the conduct described in such subsections took place in any territory or possession of the
United States.

18 U.S.C. § 2421. Transportation generally
a. In General.—Whoever knowingly transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce
… with intent that such individual engage in … any sexual activity for which any person can be
charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 10 years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 2421A. Promotion or facilitation of prostitution and reckless disregard of sex
trafficking
a. I n General.—Whoever, using a facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce or in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce, owns, manages, or operates an interactive computer
service … with the intent to promote or facilitate the prostitution of another person shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both.
b. A
 ggravated Violation.—Whoever, using a facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce
or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, owns, manages, or operates an interactive
computer service … with the intent to promote or facilitate the prostitution of another person
and—
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1. promotes or facilitates the prostitution of 5 or more persons; or
2. acts in reckless disregard of the fact that such conduct contributed to sex trafficking, in
violation of 1591(a),
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for not more than 25 years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 2423. Transportation of minors
a. T
 ransportation With Intent to Engage in Criminal Sexual Activity.—A person who knowingly
transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign
commerce … with intent that the individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity
for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined under this title and
imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.

18 U.S.C. § 2425. Use of interstate facilities to transmit information about a minor
Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce, or within
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly initiates the
transmission of the name, address, telephone number, social security number, or electronic mail
address of another individual, knowing that such other individual has not attained the age of 16
years, with the intent to entice, encourage, offer, or solicit any person to engage in any sexual activity
for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

IV. L
 ive Online Child Sexual Abuse & Sexual Exploitation of
Children in the Context of Travel and Tourism
18 U.S.C. § 2260. Production of sexually explicit depictions of a minor for importation into
the United States
a. U
 se of Minor.—A person who, outside the United States, employs, uses, persuades, induces,
entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage
in, or who transports any minor with the intent that the minor engage in any sexually explicit
conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of
transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, intending that the visual depiction will be
imported or transmitted into the United States … shall be punished as provided in subsection
(c).
b. U
 se of Visual Depiction.—A person who, outside the United States, knowingly receives,
transports, ships, distributes, sells, or possesses with intent to transport, ship, sell, or distribute
any visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct (if the production of the
visual depiction involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct), intending
that the visual depiction will be imported into the United States … shall be punished as provided
in subsection (c).
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c. Penalties.—
1. A person who violates subsection (a) … shall be [fined under this title and imprisoned not less
than 15 years nor more than life].
2. A person who violates subsection (b) … shall be [fined under this title and imprisoned not less
than 5 years nor more than 40 years].

18 U.S.C. § 2423. Transportation of minors
…
b.	Travel With Intent To Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct.—A person who travels in interstate
commerce or travels into the United States, or a United States citizen or an alien admitted for
permanent residence in the United States who travels in foreign commerce, with a motivating
purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
c.	Engaging in Illicit Sexual Conduct in Foreign Places.—Any United States citizen or alien
admitted for permanent residence who travels in foreign commerce or resides, either
temporarily or permanently, in a foreign country, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct with
another person shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
d.	Ancillary Offenses.—Whoever, for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial
gain, arranges, induces, procures, or facilitates the travel of a person knowing that such a person
is traveling in interstate commerce or foreign commerce with a motivating purpose of engaging
in illicit sexual conduct shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 30 years, or
both.
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APPENDIX 3: SENTENCING FACTORS
RECOMMENDED BY U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION179
The U.S. Sentencing Commission identified three primary factors as recommended areas of focus in
sentencing “non-production child pornography offenders” (e.g., receipt, distribution, or possession).180
These include:
1. “the content of the offender’s [CSAM] collection and nature of the offender’s collecting
behavior”;
2. “the offender’s degree of involvement with other offenders, particularly in an internet
community devoted to [CSAM] and child sexual exploitation”; and
3. “the offender’s engagement in sexually abusive or exploitative conduct in addition to the
[CSAM] offense, either during the instant offense or in prior history.”
Beyond these factors, the Sentencing Guidelines include enhancements based on aggravating
circumstances. Relevant in particular to this report is a two-level increase for “use of a computer”181
and a two-to-five-level increase based on the number of images.182 In fiscal year 2019, the Sentencing
Commission found that over 95% of nonproduction offenders received a sentencing enhancement
for use of a computer, and these offenses “involved a median number of 4,265 images, with some
offenders possessing and distributing millions of images and videos.”183 This further underscores
the scope of the problem as well as how CSEA has morphed with technology and the internet.
For people convicted of production offenses, the U.S. Sentencing Commission has identified three
separate, albeit similar, factors as relevant to sentencing.184 These include:
1. Proximity—“the physical proximity and relationship between offenders and victims,
methods of communication used to induce victims’ participation in the offense, and whether
offenders and victims lived in the same household”;
2. Participation—“the offender’s level of involvement with victims during the production
offense, such as the method used to produce the child pornography, whether the offender
engaged in sexual contact with victims, or whether the offender manipulated victims through
incapacitation, coercion, enticement, or misrepresentation”; and
3. Propensity—“the offender’s level of engagement in child pornography or exploitive conduct in
addition to the production offense, such as whether the offender distributed or collected child
pornography in addition to the production offense or engaged in unrelated exploitation or
physical sexual abuse of a child.”

179 For the complete reports, which also include data on sentencing patterns for the different types of offenses, see www.ussc.gov/topic/childpornography.
180 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography: Non-Production Offenses, 2 and 28.
181 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, 2021, § 2G2.2(b)(6).
182 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2G2.2(b)(7).
183 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography: Non-Production Offenses, 4.
184 U.S. Sentencing Commission. Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography: Production Offenses.
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As with nonproduction offenses, the Sentencing Guidelines also include enhancements for
aggravating circumstances in production offenses, including “whether the offense involved the
knowing misrepresentation of a participant’s identity or use of a computer to persuade or entice a
minor to participate in sexually explicit conduct.”185 Far more production offenders received this
enhancement in fiscal year 2019 (45.7%) than those sentenced in fiscal year 2010 (19.5%), further
demonstrating the changes in offending behavior.186

185 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography: Production Offenses, 13. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual,
§ 2G2.1(b)(6) (A two-level enhancement applies “if, for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material or for the purpose of transmitting such
material live, the offense involved (A) the knowing misrepresentation of a participant’s identity to persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the
travel of, a minor to engage [in] sexually explicit conduct; or (B) the use of a computer or an interactive computer service to (i) persuade, induce,
entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct, or to otherwise solicit participation by a minor in such
conduct; or (ii) solicit participation with a minor in sexually explicit conduct.”)
186 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography: Production Offenses, 20.
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